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ARTICLES

CONFRONTING THE AGENCY IN
BATTERED MOTHERS
ELAINE CHiu*

I.

Domestic violence is no longer a new social issue for Americans. For
the past three decades, there has been an undeniable rise in awareness about
the problem in the national consciousness.1 Today, many Americans
confront domestic violence daily through extensive media coverage of
homicides, sensational trials, other serious incidents, and purposeful public
education campaigns by the government and other interested institutions.
Accompanying this rise in public awareness have been numerous
improvements in how law enforcement, social service agencies, and courts
respond to domestic violence. These improvements include legislation
authorizing warrantless arrests in domestic violence misdemeanors,2
* Research Fellow at Columbia Law School. This Article was written xhile the author was a
Climenko Thayer Teaching Fellow at Harvard Law School from 1999-2000. From 1994-98, she was
an Assistant District Attorney in the New York County District Attorney's Office. The author would
like to thank the following people for their support and encouragement of this Article: Professors
Martha MImow and Todd Rakoff of Harvard Law School, Professor Joseph Liu of Hastings Law
School, Catherine Claypoole, Meryl Kessler, Emily Manove, Jeffrey Seul, Shaun Spencer, and Amy
Chan.
1. See ETHEL KLEN, JACQUELYN CAMPBELL, ESTA SOLER. & MAPJSSA GtEz. F-NDING
DOMESTIC VIoLENcE: CHANGING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONSIHALTING THE EnDEMIC 8-9, 95-96 (1997).

The most dramatic increase in public concern for domestic violence occurred in the summer of 1994
when the OJ. Simpson trial became "a national 'teach-in' on the issue of domestic violence." Id. In a
November 1995 poll, more participants regarded domestic violence as an extremely or very important
problem. I& at 8-9, 12 thl.1.6. In that poll, domestic violence was ranked higher in importance than
any other social issue, including street crime and children living in poverty. Id.
2. See Developments in the Lm: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L REV.
1498, 1536-37 (1993). The only two states without such statutes are Alabama and West Virginia.
where police officers can make a warrantless arrest for a domestic violence misdemeanor only if the
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increased numbers of shelters3 for battered women 4 and their children, and
more sensitive custody rules in family courts.5 The rise in public
awareness and the accompanying improvements are due in large part to the
efforts of the feminist movement, which
has consistently kept domestic
6
violence at the forefront of its agenda.
Despite the progress of the last three decades, the American public
and even feminists remain caught in a web of ambivalence and
contradictory attitudes and beliefs about battered women. Are battered

women traumatized victims who suffer at the hands of their individual
abusers and from the systemic failures of a male-dominated culture? Are
they, therefore, unable to save themselves or their children? In contrast, are
these women survivors who manage to protect themselves as best they can

under uniquely difficult circumstances? Do they deserve recognition for
their efforts, or do battered women somehow contribute to or exacerbate

their own abuse and, therefore, share the blame for their violent
predicaments? Conflicting beliefs about battered women have translated

into conflicting policies and laws in the battle against domestic violence.
crime occurred in their presence. See id. In addition to warrantless arrest powers, an equally important
improvement in arrest policies has been the adoption of mandatory arrest laws in more than half the
states. Joan Zorza, MandatoryArrest for Domestic Violence: Why It May Prove the Best FirstStep in
Curbing Repeat Abuse, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1995, at 2, 4.
3. In 1992, there were approximately 1,200 shelters in the United States with a persistent need
for more. See Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, § 6 at 23. Many of
these shelters reported turning away three out of four women in need of help. Id.
4. The focus of this Article will be on battered women, since men are the abusers and women
are the victims in the vast majority of domestic violence incidents. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA

21

(1983) (stating that, between 1973-77, men committed 95% of all assaults on spouses or ex-spouses).
More recent data indicate that women are the victims roughly 85% of the time when the perpetrator is
an intimate partner. See CALLiE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICrIMIZATON 2000, at 8 tbl.4. While acknowledging instances
of abuse in same-sex relationships and abuser-victim gender role reversal, this Article will refer to
abusers as male and to victims as female.
5. See Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody and Visitation Decisions in Domestic Violence
Cases: Legal Trends, Research Findings,and Recommendations, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE
RESOURCES (Aug. 1998), at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/vawnet/custody.htm.
A growing number of
states have included domestic violence as one factor to consider in the best interests of the child, and by
1997, thirteen states had even established a "rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the child
and not in the best interest of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical
custody with" the batterer. Id.
6. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation,90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 26 (1991). Specifically, domestic violence awareness grew out of the
women's liberation segment of the feminist movement, as opposed to the women's rights wing. See id.
(citing SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 32-33 (1982)).
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This Article focuses on one conflict in particular. how policies and
laws deal differently with the choices of battered women. The legal system
gives, but also denies, battered women choices in a variety of ways. It
acknowledges, but also refuses to acknowledge, the past choices of battered
women. For example, some policies, particularly in the criminal justice
system, consider battered women to be weak and helpless. These policies,
consequently, deny women any choice, even though crucial decisions that
seriously affect their lives are involved. Other laws, such as those
concerning restraining orders, typically require battered women to make
choices and to take the initiative in order to successfully resist their
abusers.
Still other practices are even more harsh because they
retrospectively denounce the "choices" battered women have made,
effectively punishing the women personally for their responses in situations
that did not permit true choices. Do battered women have choices?
"Always," "Sometimes," and "Never" are each correct responses in the
present hodgepodge of policies.
The absence of consistency on the issue of choice for battered women
stems from each policy's exclusive reliance on one simplistic image of
battered women. The inconsistent and unsophisticated images are both
troubling aspects of the recent legal and policy innovations in the
movement to end domestic violence. As stated by Susan Hirsch:
[F]oundational constructs were powerful tools for changing
consciousness and providing new policy directions, yet they elided other
ways of seeing the problems and imagining solutions. Theories built on
particular images always mask or foreclose others. And the images
themselves are at risk of turning perverse, as illustrated by painful,
paradoxical examples: a battered woman who loses custody of her
children because, in the eyes of the law, her injuries preclude her from
providing for them adequately. 7
Arguably, the only consistency in the present system is that battered
women always end up with the short end of the stick: either being denied a
voice by the system that is supposedly acting in their best interest or being
blamed for abuse that they cannot completely control when the
consequences of such abuse are extreme, or, worst of all, being denied
sufficient support from a social services system that has only paid lip
service to the enormous domestic violence problem thus far.
7. Susan F. Hirsch, Introduction to Sea I.: Images of Violence in THE PUBUc NATURE oF
PRIVATE VIOLENcE: THE DIscOvERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 3, 3 (Martha Albstson Finenmn &
Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
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Like many people, I too began with mixed beliefs about the role and
choice that battered women actually have within their relationships and that
they should have within the larger movement to eradicate domestic

violence. From 1994 to 1998, as an Assistant District Attorney in the New
York County District Attorney's Office, I worked with numerous battered

women in prosecuting misdemeanor and felony offenses. During this time,
there were mandatory and warrantless arrest policies in the New York City

Police Department' and a no-drop prosecution policy, meaning that cases
were not dropped simply because a battered woman refused to cooperate.
Instead, prosecutors in the office decided whether and how long to pursue
each case of domestic violence and considered the wishes of the battered
woman as only one of many factors. 9 In felony cases, prosecutors regularly
used their power to subpoena a battered woman to the grand jury and
occasionally to the witness stand at trial; 10 at the same time, prosecutors

frequently dismissed cases of domestic violence, stating on the record that
they could not prove the criminal charges beyond a reasonable doubt
without the cooperation of the battered woman. Such dismissals occurred
mostly with misdemeanor offenses.
Regardless of the ultimate

disposition," there was a uniform policy requiring each individual
prosecutor to make strenuous efforts to meet and interview every
8. See, Celestine Bohlen, Domestic Violence Arrests Quadruplein New York City, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 1988, at B3. The mandatory arrest policy requires the arrest of batterers who are still present
when the police arrive if there is probable cause. See id. Prior to this policy, individual police officers
had discretion to arrest batterers, to remove the batterer from the premises, to attempt to arbitrate
between the parties, or even to do nothing. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
9. For a description of some relevant factors prosecutors consider in evaluating domestic
violence cases, see LISA G. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE

41-44 (1981).

10. In a national survey of local prosecutors' offices, 92% of prosecutors reported that subpoena
power was the most common method used to deal with uncooperative battered women. Donald J.
Rebovich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence: Results of a Survey of Large Jurisdictions, in

Do ARRESTS

AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?

176, 186 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds.,

1996).
11. During my tenure at the District Attorney's Office, there were very few domestic violence
trials on either the felony or misdemeanor levels. Instead, many of these cases were plea-bargained,
which usually demanded intensive negotiations and cooperation among prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and judges. This is an interesting contrast to other jurisdictions, such as in Massachusetts, where almost
every domestic violence case, including misdemeanors, goes to trial. In addition, only a minority of
offenders received serious sentences, such as jail or supervised probation. Many dispositions involved
treatment programs for both violence and substance abuse, or even delayed dismissals, especially in
misdemeanor matters. Whatever the final disposition, abusers were frequently subject to restraining
orders for the duration of the criminal proceedings and as part of their final sentences. For further
analysis of the effects of New York's mandatory arrest policy, see New York State Office for the
Prevention of Domestic Violence, Family Protectionand Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994:
Evaluation of the Mandatory Arrest Provisions, Third Interim Report to the Governor and the
Legislature (Oct. 2000), http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/criminaljustice/police/execsumnOO.hml.
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complainant in a domestic violence case before deciding on the appropriate
course of action. As a result of all these policies, I met with many battered
women and even developed relationships with some of them through
frequent interaction over the lives of their cases.
Often, my meetings with battered women were longer and more
thorough than the appointments I had with victims of non-domestic
violence crimes. Like many of my colleagues, my approach was to try and
understand not only the most recent violent incident, but also the history
and dynamics of the relationship. What struck me as I listened to their life
stories was that for all of these women, there were numerous instances
during their relationships in which they had to make decisions. For
instance, battered women often had to decide between telling their friends
and family about the abuse or keeping it a secret, or between seeking
professional medical treatment or trying to self-treat their injuries. For the
majority of the women I interviewed, the instant decision that brought them
to my office was whether or not to call the police during the most recent
outbreak of violence."2 All of these decisions were difficult ones and yet
very familiar to most battered women.
The women that had perhaps the most trying decisions to make were
the battered mothers whose children lived with them and, thus, shared in
the horrors of the violence at home. Very often, due to the almost universal
lack of child care, I had the privilege of also meeting the children. They sat
outside my office in the hallway and patiently waited for their mothers to
talk to me. Sometimes, I also interviewed the children. For this special
subset of abused women, their decisions impacted not only themselves, but
also their children. For many battered mothers, the primary motivation in
their decisions was the well-being of their children. This motivation,
however, worked both ways: sometimes it encouraged battered mothers to
leave their abusers; while other times, it encouraged them to stay.
This Article aims to draw attention to all the micro- and macro-level
decisions that battered women, and particularly battered mothers, make
throughout their experience of domestic violence. These decisions are
opportunities for both the women and domestic violence policymakers. By
understanding the motivations behind the decisions and incorporating those
motivations into laws and policies, policymakers can do more by
12.

Some cases drew the attention of the police through emergency phone calls for help or other

contacts from the battered women themselves. There was. however, a significant number of cases
where neighbors, teachers, or social workers initiated reports that led to arrests and prosecutions by the
district attorney's office.
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recognizing the choices of battered women, while heavily influencing their
decisions. The system needs to identify and eliminate the troubling
conflicts in its present policies by squarely confronting the agency that
battered women have, accepting the agency, and using it to an advantage in
battling domestic violence. The choices battered women make are
significant ones and policies should aim to improve them. This is
especially true of battered mothers whose actions impact not only
themselves, but also their children.
Part H of this Article begins with an examination of some current
policies in the fight against domestic violence and their contrary positions
on the choices of battered women and on the victim-agent debate.
Part m then explores in detail the history and contours of the victimagent debate, including the significant contributions of Lenore Walker and
Elizabeth Schneider in moving the image of battered women closer to
reality.
The agency of battered women should not be feared or merely
punished in hindsight; instead, as Part IV explains, it should be recognized,
accepted, and assisted by both feminist theorists and policymakers.
Finally, the Article concludes in Part V by focusing on battered
mothers and failure to protect proceedings as a prime example of where
agency can be used effectively to interrupt the vicious cycle of family
violence. It specifically proposes that where evidence of abuse against
mothers exists, there be a mandatory probationary period of intensive
counseling and support services for battered mothers prior to any removal
of the children, and prior to definitive findings of child neglect or child
abuse, or any termination of parental rights.
II.
Over the past thirty years, there have been many significant changes in
how the criminal justice, family court, and social service systems handle
domestic violence. A brief review of some prominent reforms reveals an
uncoordinated mixture of positions on the choices of battered women.
These positions can be roughly organized into three categories: policies
that deny the choices of battered women, policies that empower women by
giving or even requiring them to make choices, and policies that evaluate
the decisions made by battered women, mostly in hindsight, and punish
allegedly bad ones.
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A. DENYING CHOICES

In this first category, battered women have no voice. They have no
say. Decisions that may have serious repercussions on their lives are made

by others without their consent or contribution. The most notorious of
these policies are the mandatory arrest policies of police departments and
the no-drop policies of prosecution offices.

Inspired by costly lawsuits' 3 and a series of arrest experiments
originating with the Sherman and Berk study in Minneapolis,' 4 mandatory

arrest policies spread across police departments in the 1980s.15 Such
policies require, either by law or by practice, a police officer to arrest a
batterer who remains on the scene after the officer has arrived, if there is
probable cause to believe that the batterer has committed a domestic
violence crime. The police officer is authorized to do so in most states

without an arrest warrant, even for misdemeanor domestic violence
crimes.16 The police officer cannot simply remove the batterer from the

household or attempt to calm down the batterer. The primary purpose of
the mandatory arrest policies is to remove the discretion of individual

police officers to arrest or not to arrest domestic violence batterers; the
secondary effect, however, has also been to remove or ignore the choices of
battered women.
13. One such lawsuit concerned the police department in a small town in Connecticut. Thurman
v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). In 1984, Tracey Thurman won a
$2.3 million judgment against the City of Torrington, Connecticut for the police department's failure to
protect her from her husband's violence. Nat Hentoff, Battered Wives and the FourteenthAmendment,
WASH. PoST, Jul. 27, 1985, at A23. A Torrington police officer stood by and observed while the
husband kicked Tracey Thurman in the head, dropped her child on her, and kicked her again. Thunan,
595 F. Supp. at 1526. This lawsuit led to the adoption of mandatory arrest laws in Connecticut in 1986
and a remarkable 99% rise in domestic violence arrests in nine months following the passage of the law.
Jacqueline Weaver, Arrests Risefor Violence in the Home, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1987, § I ICN. at 1.
14. Conducted from 1980-83, the Minneapolis experiment had police officers randomly use
three different responses in attending to domestic violence calls where the abuser was still present.
LAWRENCEW. SHERMAN, PoICING DOMsTIC VIOLENCE 2 (1992). Used with equal frequency, these
three responses included immediate arrest of the abuser, removal of the abuser from the residence, and
attempts to calm the battered woman and the abuser. See id.After tracking the specific couples for a
period of six months after the arrest, Sherman and Berk observed that the arrest response was more
effective than the other two responses because it reduced the risk of repeat violence against the woman
by half during the next six months. See id.Later studies in cities like Omaha, Charlotte, Milwaukee,
Miami, and Colorado Springs tried to replicate the results of the Minneapolis experiment and had mixed
results. Zorza, supra note 2, at 4-9, 51-52 (attributing mixed results of the replication studies to design
defects and explaining why mandatory arrest policies are still warranted).
15. By 1995, "more than half of the states and the District of Columbia requirled] police to aest
on probable cause for at least some domestic violence crimes:' Zorza, supranote 2, at 4.
16. See supranote 2 and accompanying text.
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When a battered woman calls for assistance, the reason for the call is
not necessarily that she wants to have the police involved or to have the
police arrest the abuser. To the contrary, in my experience, plenty of
women who called for help desired only medical assistance or physical
removal of the abuser from their home. They were surprised and even
angered by the police officers' insistence on arrest and strongly opposed
the arrest and subsequent prosecution in my office a few days, or even
hours, later.' 7 In addition, there were also numerous cases where a
neighbor, relative, or child had called the police, who still had to arrest the
batterers in spite of the women's wishes. This is exactly the point of
mandatory arrest policies. It does not matter who called the police or
whether the concerned victims wanted the arrest of the perpetrators. If
there is probable cause, then arrest is the only permitted response.
Mandatory arrest policies do not accommodate the wishes of battered
women, and thus deny them any choice in the matter.
Supplementing mandatory arrest policies are the no-drop policies of
prosecutors' offices. 18 After all, mandatory arrest policies would be less
effective in deterring domestic violence 6rime if prosecutors routinely
dismissed the domestic violence cases. Batterers would have only the
arrest itself to fear and not any subsequent criminal prosecution. For some
batterers, arrest itself may be enough of a deterrent, but for others, only
arrest followed by criminal prosecution and the threat of a criminal
conviction and punishment would work.
Sixty-six percent of prosecutors' offices in large urban areas reported
adoption of some form of a no-drop policy. 19 There are numerous
variations of no-drop policies, but the common denominator is the
imposition of rules or policies that strive to keep the discretion to prosecute
within the purview of the prosecutor and not the battered woman.
17. Before the mid-1980s, when the New York City Police Department began its mandatory
arrest policy, many police officers may have asked the women whether they wanted to have the abusers
arrested and followed their wishes accordingly. After the institution of the mandatory arrest policy, all
police officers were under command not to consult with the women and, instead, to ignore the desperate
pleas of battered women, who begged them not to arrest their abusers. Initially, some of the battered
women may have been angered and confused because they were unaware of the change in policy.
Battered women continued to be angry and confused by the mandatory arrest policy as late as 1994-98,
when I was at the District Attorney's office. I observed that there were always some battered women
whose wishes were incompatible with the mandatory arrest policy.
18. No-drop policies "may constitute the judicial equivalence of a mandatory arrest policy
[because v]ictim autonomy is restricted in the higher interest of specific or general deterrence of
offenders."

EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

RESPONSE 178 (2d ed. 1996).
19. Rebovich, supranote 10, at 182-83.
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"Soft '20 no-drop policies ignore the preferences of battered women in
the first instance, but also use support services and outreach to encourage
and support battered women. If a woman still decides not to cooperate in
the prosecution after availing herself of the support services and there is
insufficient evidence without her cooperation, then the prosecutor will
dismiss the charges. 21 The woman will not be subject to any punishment
for her decision not to cooperate. Informal surveys indicate that most
prosecutors' offices feature "soft" no-drop policies.'
In contrast, "hard" no-drop policies use every available legal tool to
mandate victim participation in cases where there would be sufficient
evidence to prove criminal charges only if that evidence included victim
testimony. The most controversial tools used in "hard" policies are the
subpoenas issued to bring the women to court, the arrest or bench warrants
issued against women who ignore the subpoenas and do not show up in
court, and finally, imprisonment of battered women who are brought to
court on the warrant and still refuse to cooperate.
Prosecutors under both "hard" and "soft" no-drop policies vill
continue to pursue the charges against abusers if there is sufficient evidence
without the cooperation of battered women, even if the women do not
desire the prosecution.
Such evidence could include independent
eyewitnesses like neighbors or bystanders, photographs of physical injuries
and property damage, audio tapes of emergency 911 calls, official medical
records, and any excited utterances. 3 The pursuit of criminal convictions
under such circumstances leads perhaps to the most curious silencing of
battered women. Because the welfare of the woman need not be a
consideration, the entire proceeding can take place without her.
On the surface, "soft" and "hard" no-drop prosecution policies share
the goal of keeping the decision-making power within the prosecutor's
office and away from battered women, and hence, are categorized as
policies that deny the choices of battered women. Deeper analysis,
20. Naomi Caln bifurcates no-drop policies into "soft" and "hard." See Naomi RL Cahn,
Innovative Approaches to the Prosecutionof Domestic Violence Crinws: An Overvietiv in DOMEsTc

VIoLENmCE, TIE CHANGING CRImNALJusTIcE RESPONSE 161,168 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzai
eds., 1992).
21. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participationin Domestic Violence

Prosecutions,109 HARV. L REV. 1849, 1864 (1996).
22. Id. at 1863.
23. While supporting "hard" no-drop policies, Hanna also advocates the increased collection and
use of evidence that is independent of battered women. She believes that such a strategy helps to
overcome the troubling theoretical problems raised by forcing victim participation in domestic violence
prosecutions. See id at 1900-01.
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however, reveals some interesting contrasts in how these policies approach
the subject of choice for battered women. First, the choices of battered

women have some impact, albeit limited, on the decisions of "soft"
prosecutors' offices as to whether or not to criminally pursue the abusers;

"hard" no-drop policies are more akin to mandatory arrest policies in that
these prosecutors make their decisions independently of the battered

women. Second, "soft" no-drop policies utilize only positive influences in
the form of victim and support services to encourage women to cooperate,
whereas "hard" policies incorporate negative and punitive influences to
force women to cooperate.24 Despite these underlying differences, no-drop
policies generally deny the choices of battered women because under all

such policies the discretion to prosecute remains within the purview of the
prosecutor and not the battered woman.

Is this purposeful refusal to

consider their desires or preferences in mandatory arrest and no-drop
policies the key to their success?25
B. PROVIDING CHOICES
In contrast to the mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies,
there have been other systematic reforms in the fight against domestic

violence that seek to empower battered women. Perhaps the most widely
known policy of this type has been the restraining order.2 6 All fifty states

and the District of Columbia currently provide civil restraining orders in
cases of domestic violence. 27 Indeed, some states have been so impressed

with the restraining order that they have allowed both civil and criminal
24.
25.

See infra Part ll.C. (discussing policies that punish the choices of battered women).
Recent commentary has questioned the efficacy of policies that deny choice to battered

women. See, e.g., Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction to Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING

ORDERS WORK? 1, 12 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, eds., 1996) (blaming the particularly
indifferent and resilient batterer population that the arrest and restraining order policies target for their
ineffectiveness and advocating greater acknowledgment of victims' preferences over societal interests).
Supporters of such policies continue to argue that while these policies arguably disempower battered
women, it is far worse to be reabused and even killed. See, e.g., Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a
Populationof Court Restrained Male Batterers, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAININO ORDERS WORK?

192,210 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, eds., 1996).
26. A restraining order is also known as a civil protection order and a variety of other names,
depending upon the jurisdiction. David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of
Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Oiders, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 1153, 1170 n.91

(1995). Essentially, a restraining order is a formal court order against a particular individual that
typically forbids that individual from engaging in particular conduct for a fixed period of time. See,
e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1314 (West 6th ed. 1990); Zlotnick, supra, at 1170.

27. All fifty states have civil restraining orders for spouses, while approximately half of the
states also have civil restraining orders for unmarried or unrelated household members. Zlotnick, supra
note 26, at 1171 n.93.
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restraining orders for domestic violence cases, 2 while other states have
vested more than one court in their judicial system with the authority to
29
issue civil restraining orders.

Restraining orders, particularly civil ones, are creative empowering
legal tools for battered women for several reasons. First, instead of taking

away choice from battered women, they create choices. As documented by
many domestic violence specialists and studies, battered women are

understandably reluctant to initiate or participate in criminal proceedings,
especially as their first step in trying to stop the violence or end the

relationship.30 Thus, a system that offers as its only option the criminal
courts through mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies is, for
many battered women, no option at all. The criminal justice system's
preoccupation with punishment and greater community deterrence goals
does not appeal to many battered women. 31 In contrast, these same women

may feel more comfortable with a civil proceeding and its exclusive
concern with the individual parties at hand and the accommodation of more
limited goals, such as elimination of the violence without removal of the

batterer. Whether it is an alternative or an addition to the criminal justice
system, the mere existence of the civil restraining order enhances the

options available to battered women.
Even on a micro level, the entire framework of the civil restraining
order is built around the choices of battered women. For instance, it is

almost always the initiative of the battered woman that begins the process
28. Examples of states with criminal restraining orders include New York. Alaska, Illinois.
Mfinnesota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Utah. See Christopher R. Frank. Comment. Criminal Protection
Orders in Domestic Violence Cases:Getting Rid of Rats with Snakes. 50 U. MAMI L REv. 919.922 &
n.9 (1996). The distinction between criminal and civil restraining orders is that a criminal court issues a
criminal restraining order as part of its power to set bail conditions during the pendency of a criminal
matter and then as part of its power to determine the sentence at the conclusion of the criminal
proceeding. A civil court uses its equitable powers to issue a civil restraining order upon a s ific
petition for such an order by one private party against another. Because of their origins in separate
judicial systems, criminal and civil restraining orders are subject to different burdens of proof and do
not have identical purposes. See generally Frank, supra (providing a critical examination of criminal
restraining orders).
29. For instance, Chapter 209A in Massachusetts creates an elaborate system for civil restraining
orders in domestic violence, whereby four different courts have the authority to issue such orders to
battered women. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 209A § 1 (1999).
30. See Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System, in Do ARRESTS AND
RESTRAnING ORDERs WoRK? 98, 102-03 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (describing
numerous reasons for reluctance of battered women).
31. SeeidatlOl.
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of obtaining a civil restraining order. 32 She is the petitioner in the court
proceeding that is now entitled, "She" v. "He." Immediately upon

petitioning for a civil restraining order, the battered woman must make
numerous decisions. She must decide which court to apply for such a
petition,33 whether to request a full "stay away" order or a limited "stop the
abuse" order, and whether to ask only for a restraining order or to also ask
for child custody or support.34 Because these are not simple decisions and
because most battered women are not legal experts, domestic violence
advocates in some jurisdictions have striven to assist women in making
well-informed choices and in effectively using this opportunity to have an
impact on the legal proceedings. 35 Perhaps in recognition of the
importance of enabling and honoring battered women's choices, some
states mandate by statute that the women be repeatedly informed of their
36
rights and options in seeking a restraining order.
In addition to its existence as an alternative to the criminal justice
system and its inclusion of battered women's decisions, restraining orders

are also important for battered women because they are emotionally
empowering. One study conducted by Karla Fischer in 1990 and 1991
surveyed battered women who sought restraining orders in a mid-western,
medium-sized urban county court with the help of a local shelter. 37 The
32. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE:
A MODEL STATE CODE § 301 (allowing only victims to file for a petition for an order of protection).
33. For example, the Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994 in New
York State gave battered women the right the proceed either in family court, in criminal courts, or in
both courts simultaneously. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11 (1) (McKinney 2000).
34. In New York State Family Court, petitioners can apply for a restraining order alone or can
initiate custody and support proceedings along with the restraining order. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240 (McKinney 2000). The court has the authority, even at the ex parte stage of an initial petition, to
issue temporary custody and support orders without a demonstration of immediate or emergency need
and without information about the batterer's assets or income. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 828(1), (4),
842 (McKinney 2000). The Probate and Family Court in Massachusetts shares similar ex parte powers
on custody and support. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A § 3 (1999).
35. Advocates play a critical role in helping women make these decisions because they offer
their familiarity and experience with the court systems and legal proceedings, both of which are usually
overwhelming for battered women. For example, students and attorneys at the Domestic Violence
Institute at the Northeastern School of Law generally advise women not to request restraining orders
from the Superior Court in Massachusetts because of the court's geographic inconvenience, its overly
formal atmosphere, and the competition for attention amidst the serious criminal felonies and civil
matters concerning more than $25,000. See Interview with Karen Raye, Clinical Teaching Fellow at
the Domestic Violence Institute at Northeastern School of Law, in Boston, Mass. (Sept. 29, 1999).
36. For example, various actors such as judges, prosecutors, and police officers are required by
law to inform battered women in New York State of their right to proceed in Family Court, the criminal
courts, or both. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(2), (2-a), (6) (McKinney 2000).
37. Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When "Enough is Enough": Battered Women's Decision
Making Around Court Ordersof Protection,41 CRIME & DELINQ. 414, 415,428 n.1 (1995).
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purpose of the study was to achieve a greater understanding of the fears and
motivations battered women had in seeking restraining orders. 38 The most
striking conclusion of the study was that restraining orders were
psychologically meaningful for many battered women because they
39
represented symbols of the women's own strength and voice.
The order of protection becomes, for many women, a symbol of her own
internalized strength; it represents the time she stood up to her abuser
and told him, through the judge who signed her order, that she refused to
"take it" anymore. As nearly all battered women are silenced about the
abuse and the impact it has on their lives, the legal system becomes an
enabling factor that allows them to find their own voices again.
...Women repeatedly expressed that they felt as if they have
constantly told him that they do not like the abuse, they are not going to
stand for it, they want him to leave them alone, and that, in fact, he
cannot abuse them. Whereas their voices were silenced or simply not
heard, the force behind the legal paper communicated for them, in
language to which the abuser was forced to respond. 40
By placing a powerful legal tool within the control of battered women,
the restraining order regime not only respects the choices of battered
women, but also enhances them. It remains unclear whether a restraining
order regime based upon women's decisions is effective at reducing or
eliminating domestic violence or whether its effectiveness is compromised
by reliance on women's choices. 4 '
C. PUNISHING CHOICES
In addition to denying and providing choices for battered women,
there is a third position upon which some policies are based: critiquing past
decisions made by individual battered women and punishing the "bad"
decisions. The two most commonly recognized practices that fall within
this third category are the criminal prosecution of battered women who kill
their abusers and the civil termination of parental rights of battered
38.

See idat414-15.

39. See ji at424.
40. Id at 424-25.
41. A study of male batterers brought to court for civil restraining orders in Quiney,
Massachusetts concluded that the ineffectiveness of restraining orders was mostly related to the
character of the batterer population and not the involvement of battered women. See Klein. supranote
25. "[Not only do they [the batterers] have prior records like criminals and have abused their current
spouses/partners like criminals, but they also re-abuse and reoffend at high rates, just like active

criminals." lId
at 205.
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mothers. Societal goals that are distinct from the elimination of domestic
violence motivate both of these practices.
For example, criminal
prosecutions of battered women are brought in the interest of the state to
punish all murderers and to deter future homicides. Similarly, parental
right terminations are instituted on behalf of the children, often by state
child welfare agencies. Despite these external interests, it is unmistakable
that such proceedings have a tremendous impact on battered women,
whether purposeful or not. Both types of legal proceedings are judgmental
in nature and the subject of their judgment are the past decisions and
choices of battered women. Because Part IV of the Article will focus
exclusively on the termination of parental rights, the following discussion
will briefly discuss only criminal prosecutions of battered women who kill.
Unlike mandatory arrest policies and restraining order systems, such
criminal prosecutions are not new. Indeed, infamous prosecutions of
battered women who killed their abusers date back to the late nineteenth
century.42 Female defendants used a variety of defenses, including lack of
motive, that did not necessarily emphasize the domestic violence.43 The
rise of the feminist movement in the 1960s, however, inspired greater and
more honest awareness of the prevalence of domestic violence and led to
an increased desire to use the domestic violence in a new defense for
battered women.
Criminal prosecutions, in and of themselves, already asked decisionmakers, such as the jurors or judges, to engage in a comprehensive
examination of an accused person's prior intentions, actions, statements,
and states of mind. The new strategy was not to use a plea of insanity but
to introduce a modification of another long-standing defense strategy,
44
namely self-defense. Prompted by the landmark work of Lenore Walker,
this new permutation of self-defense became widely known as the "battered
woman syndrome."
A woman suffering from the classic syndrome experiences a pattern of
physical and psychological abuse that occurs in a three-stage cycle.45 First,
42. One case in particular was the trial of Fanny Hyde in 1872 in Brooklyn, New York, on
charges of murder of her employer and lover, George Watson. By pleading insanity and testifying
about Watson's abuse, Fanny Hyde was able to avoid conviction. See ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL
163-66 (1980).
43. See id. at 93-102.
44. Walker is a renowned psychologist who began her in-depth interviews of battered women
and domestic violence advocates in the mid-1970s and published her findings in two prominent books.
See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter WALKER, BATrERED WOMAN];
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).
45.

See WALKER, BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 44, at 55.
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there is the tension-building stage with isolated, yet escalating incidents of
abuse.46 Second, there is an acute battering stage with uncontrollable
outbreaks of intense violence.4 7 Third, the abuser is contrite and acts
lovingly and seeks forgiveness." This three-stage cycle repeats itself again
and again, eventually leading to certain behavioral and psychological traits
in the woman. 4 9 She has very low self-esteem and is continually guarded
and fearful of another episode of abuse.50 Over time, she develops "learned
helplessness," a condition in which she believes that she has no control
over these episodes or her future and has no real option to leave her abuser;
she is paralyzed into staying with him."1
Domestic violence advocates were inspired by the gravity of saving
battered women from death row or life imprisonment for killing their
abusers. Under the umbrella of battered woman syndrome, they launched
the most intense study of battered women ever undertaken. As a result, the
behavior, options, and decisions of battered women were repeatedly
reviewed, surveyed, evaluated, and discussed. Through numerous studies
and the testimony of expert witnesses,5 2 judges and jurors were better able
to comprehend this syndrome and accept the desperation (or rationality) of
the "choices" of the battered woman. They more willingly opted not to
impose any criminal liability or to impose a lesser degree of liability. This
new defense served to eliminate the sex-bias in traditional self-defense
theory and to enable judges, jurors, and prosecutors to better understand the
particular accused person: the battered woman.53 Perhaps because of a
46.

Id. at 55, 56-59.

47.

L at 55,59-65.

48.

Id at 55, 65-70.

49.
50.
51.

See id. at55.
See id. at 69.
See id. at 55-70.

52. Throughout the 1980s, the admissibility of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
was the primary legal issue for appellate courts in women's self-defense work. See Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Seyf-Defense Work and the Problem of £rpern
Testimony on Battering, 14 WoMiEN's RTs. L RFP. 213,215, 218 (1992). Most of the reviewing courts

ruled in favor of admissibility and now, defense attorneys use expert testimony at many stages of the
criminal process, including grand jury, motions to dismiss, sentencing as well as trial. Id. at 219,224.

53.

Traditional self-defense theory is replete with requirements that make no sense %hen applied

to a combat situation between a battered woman and her abuser. Two such requirements include the
duty to retreat and the use of force that is proportionate to the threatened harm. See, e.g., Douglas A.
Orr, Weiand v. State and Battered Spouse Syndrome: The Toothless 77gress Can 'ow Roar,FLA. BJ.,

June 2000, at 14 (supporting the Florida Supreme Court's decision in March 1999 to remove the
absolute duty to retreat from the residence before resorting to deadly force against a co-occupant or
invitee as an overdue accommodation for battered women claiming self-defense). Before this appellate

ruling, Dr. Lenore Walker had testified about battered woman syndrome at the trial of Kathleen Weiand
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human need to understand how domestic violence could lead to such tragic
or horrific consequences, the American public embraced these efforts to
understand the battered woman. Since its ambitious beginnings, the theory
of the battered woman syndrome has gained much acceptance and is still
being used in the courts today; 54 however, its attempt to capture the
experience of the battered woman in a comprehensible theory that could
primarily serve as a successful criminal defense has come under attack by
several critics over the past decade.
In the spectrum of positions that domestic violence policies take on
the subject of choice and battered women, this third category of punishing
their choices is unique because of two critical distinctions. First is its
retrospective perspective. As opposed to the denial or enhancement of
future choices of battered women, this third type of policy focuses on their
past decisions. It is not forward-looking, but rather backward-looking.
The second unique feature is its punitive nature. Some battered women in
these criminal prosecutions or civil terminations will be punished for their
past choices. This powerful combination of past perspective and potential
for punishment renders the policies in this third category particularly
troublesome for battered women. This, perhaps, explains why it was the
criminal prosecution of battered women, and not any other domestic
violence policy, that inspired the most intense examination of battered
women over the last thirty years.
D. WHY SO MANY CHOICES ON CHOICES?
This brief survey of some of the most visible reforms in the recent
movement against domestic violence easily demonstrates the current
ambivalence and inconsistency on the subject of choice and battered
women. Battered women are justifiably confused and puzzled. Do they
have choices or not? Will others be making decisions for them? What is
their role in this movement against domestic violence? As discussed
above, there is a minimum of three distinct positions. In certain contexts,
such as the criminal justice system, abused women do not have a say on the
issue of arrest or criminal prosecution of their abusers. In contrast, many
restraining order regimes depend upon battered women to take the initiative
and make critical decisions. Still other policies hold battered women
who shot and killed her husband; due to the duty to retreat requirement, the jury, however, rejected the
self-defense claim and convicted Kathleen Weiand of second degree murder. See id.
54. See, e.g., People v. Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (discussing the threestage cycle of battered woman syndrome in ruling that the defendant was entitled to offer expert
testimony about the syndrome.
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accountable for their alleged choices by punishing in hindsight those

choices that offend other interests of the state. It defies common sense and
fairness to have some policies ignore battered women while other reforms
depend upon them, and still other policies punish them. After all, it is the

same battered women that all these policies concern.
Why is there such inconsistency on the subject of choice and battered
women? The answer lies in the continuing evolution of the identity of the

battered woman. Despite the work of thirty years, this evolution has yet to
reach a final, definitive state.55 Underlying the inconsistency on choice and

battered women is one of the most central debates in this identity evolution:
understanding the battered woman as an agent or as a victim. Are they

purely agents, purely victims, or a combination of both? Do abused
women suffer violence exclusively at the hands of their batterers or do they
contribute to the persistence of the violence in subtle and indirect ways?
Are the women blameless or somehow blameworthy for their problems?
Elizabeth Schneider wrote in 1992 that we have gone "back and forth
between these two images without any real public engagement on the
problems underlying battering.

56

In the time since her comment, there has

still been no resolution.
This debate concerning the nature of the role (or the lack of a role) the
woman has in the abusive relationship is highly controversial because it
55. Indeed, the search for an identity may never reach a final state and may be forever evolving.
After all, the reality of a battered woman is most likely complex and naturally defies categorization or
accurate description through theory and scholarly musings. This does not mean, however, that the
search should be abandoned. Laws and policies need these images or "foundational constructs." See
suprapp. 1224-25. Martha Fineman nwrs about the limitations of the law as a tool for social change:
mhe process of lawmaking relies on the generation of broad generalizations about groups or
classes of things and people at the legislative level. On the individual case level, law is also a
process of classification-courts make decisions using analogies and distinctions within the
context of precedent and staredecisis ....
... As classification involves line-drawing and assessments of similarity and difference, it
seems clear that both as a process and in terms of fashioning responses, classification should
be understood to be of a political nature. Those who have disproportionate power will
disproportionately influence lawmaking and implementation.
Even if one believes in the abstract possibility of change and progress, it is not likely that
widespread redistribution of power within families or between women and men will be
accomplished by mere legal restructuring.
Martha Albertson Feeman, Preface to THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLECE, at xi, xvi (Martha
Albertson Freman & Roxanne Mydtiuk eds., 1994). Nevertheless, truly effective laws and policies
should be based at a minimum on a uniform understanding of battered women. There is no justification
for inconsistencies. We should use our best efforts to create images that bring us as close as possible to
the reality of battered women.
56. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularityand Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and
Practicein Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 520, 549 (1992). Neither portrayal of woman
as solely agents or solely victims is adequate, and there must be more effort made to capture the
complex reality of women's experiences while allowing for change. ld at 549-50.

1240

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1223

draws upon fundamental principles within the various camps of feminism
and within the greater American culture itself. Equally noteworthy is the
fact that the debate directly affects the question of how much choice
battered women actually have in their abusive relationships and how much
of a voice battered women should have in the larger systemic battle against
domestic violence. If battered women are victims, then they do not
contribute to the violence and should not be penalized in any way; as
victims, they are too debilitated to make their own choices. On the other
hand, if battered women are active agents, then policies should examine,
and perhaps, even punish their choices. The agency paradigm also
suggests, somewhat paradoxically, that battered women are capable of
making their own choices and should be permitted greater autonomy in
decisionmaking.
Clearly, the victim-agent debate has tremendous
ramifications for domestic violence policies. Part Three of the Article
continues with a closer look at this victim-agent debate, with a particular
emphasis on the efforts of Lenore Walker and Elizabeth Schneider to
introduce more reality to the identity of battered women and, hopefully,
bring more consistency to domestic violence policies.
II.
Victim or agent? The search for an honest and accurate identity for
battered women gnaws at the foundation of our domestic violence policies,
and until we confront the basic issue of victim or agent purposefully and
knowingly, these policies will remain confused and inconsistent. The best
place to begin an exploration of this debate is with an understanding of the
terminology involved.
A. DEFINITIONS
What do the terms "agent" and "agency" mean? These words are
commonly used in the law to describe a particular relationship "between
two persons.., where one (the agent) may act on behalf of the other (the
principal) and bind the principal by words and actions." 57 In the context of
the victim-agent debate, the words take on a different meaning. Instead of
describing a type of relationship between two individuals, the words
"agent" and "agency" are used to describe only one individual and the
conditions under which that individual lives. Agency refers to "the
57.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (West 6th ed. 1990).

2001]

AGENCY IN BATTERED MOTHERS

1241

functioning of an atomistic, mobile individual"5' 8 and is imbued with
"liberal visions of autonomy, individual action, individual control and
mobility. 59
In contrast, a "victim" lives under strikingly different conditions.
Indeed, the terms "victim" and "agent" are usually understood to represent
the opposing categories of a dichotomy. An agent is "a self-determining
individual.., who is not victimized by others" 60 while a victim is an
oppressed individual who is not free to act but is, instead, acted upon by
her oppressors. Her oppressors can include both her personal abuser and
the greater patriarchal society in which she lives.

B. THE RISE OF VICrIMIZATION
Historically, the origins of the agency terminology date back to the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the public perceived these
women to be "agents-as cause or provocateur[s] of [their own]
battering. 6 1 Abused women were not being harmed, but were enjoying or
deriving pleasure from the violence. If they were not deriving pleasure,
they had committed some wrongs to deserve the violent abuse. 62 Even
through the 1940s and 1950s, social workers often attributed complaints of
domestic violence to the woman's sexual frigidity or her need to undermine
authority. 63 These beliefs allowed society to justify its policies and
practices that condoned or ignored such violent behavior and to continue
turning a blind eye to the true horrors. This all changed with the feminist
movement of the 1960s.
In the 1960s, the activism of the feminist movement, particularly the
"women's liberation" wing, raised community awareness of domestic
violence. 61 Women from social service groups such as Al-Anon and even
58. Martha 1.Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women's Lives, Iollence, andAgencv, in
THE PuBuc NATURE OF PRIVATE VIoLENcE 59, 59 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk
eds., 1994).
59. Schneider, supra note 52, at 240.
60. Mahoney, supranote 58, at 60.
61. Schneider, supranote 56, at 549. This formerly predominant view can still be found today.
ld.
at 548-49.
62. See, e.g., Poor v. Poor, 8 N.H. 307 (1836) (holding that an abused woman was not entitled to
divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty because the abuse which included horsewhipping, assaults on the
head, and imprisonment in the cellar was due to her own misconduct). See also LINIDA GORDON,
HEROES OF THEm OWN LIVES 281-83,286 (1988).

63.

See GORDON, supranote 62, at 282 (describing the influence of Freudian thought).

64.

See Mahoney, supranote 6, at 26.
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battered women themselves helped to expose the violence.6 5 The efforts of
all these groups inspired a closer and more honest examination of domestic
violence and revealed that domestic violence was a far greater problem
than decades of purposeful ignorance had cajoled people into believing. Its
shockingly high incidence exposed the woeful inadequacies of the agent
portrayal of the battered woman.
In response, the feminist movement offered up a new understanding.
Such women were not agents or provocateurs, rather they were victims.
They were victims of their batterers and victims of a patriarchal society that
failed to act and thereby tacitly approved or conspired with their batterers'
violence. Many within the feminist movement seized upon the theory of
victimization and accelerated its development.
Perhaps the most prominent proponent of the victimization theory is
Lenore Walker. Numerous courts have relied on her definition of the
battered woman and her expert testimony in this field.66 Walker, in 1979,
defined a battered woman as:
a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something
he wants her to do without any concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationships with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple
must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second
time, and
she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
67
woman.

One of the earliest sociologists to study domestic violence, Mildred
Daley Pagelow, described battered women as:
[A]dult women who were intentionally physically abused in ways that
caused pain or injury, or who were forced into involuntary action or
restrained by force from voluntary action by adult men with whom they
65. AI-Anon organizations were among the first in the United States to open shelters for battered
women and two battered women opened their own home as the first shelter in Boston. Mahoney, supra
note 6, at 26 (citing SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 5, 55-57 (1982); Susan
Schechter, Building Bridges Benveen Activists, Professionals, and Researchers, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON WiFE ABusE 299 (Kersti Y116 & Michele Bograd eds., 1988).
66. See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (Fla. 1999) (describing expert testimony of
Lenore Walker that defendant, Kathy Weiand, suffered from battered woman syndrome). See also
Havell v. Islam, 718 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 2000) (relying on Walker's description of the
harm suffered by a battered woman to hold that domestic violence is a proper consideration in an
equitable distribution matter in a divorce proceeding).
67. See WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supranote 44, at xv.
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have or had established relationships, usually68involving sexual intimacy,

whether or not within a legally married state.

Both definitions clearly emphasize the lack of freedom and the
coercion in the living conditions of battered women. Both either downplay

or avoid any mention of self-initiated acts or voluntary conduct that
encourages or contributes to domestic violence. Early on in the movement

against domestic violence, the exclusive portrayal of these women as
wholly victims and not agents was arguably necessary for several reasons.
First, a rigid and insistent victim image was essential to counter the

historical avoidance of the problem and the long-standing antipathy
towards battered women. Second, the new identity of battered women had
to serve a very specific purpose. Defenders of battered women who had
killed their abusers were desperately searching for a sympathetic and

convincing defense for their clients, and the victimization theory seemed to
fit the bill. It eventually evolved into the battered woman syndrome. Such

women did not freely kill their spouses or boyfriends as independent
agents; rather, the women were victims of their spouses or boyfriends
whose escalating violence led to emotional paralysis and perceptual
inabilities in the women and, ultimately, to the tragic deaths. 69
Because of the heightened sensationalism and surrounding media

frenzy, the American public, as well as the American legal system, have
learned about battered women mostly from these tragic homicide cases.70
The particular context of these homicide cases create a distorted and

exaggerated view of battered women. In order to satisfy the legal
requirement that experts only testify about those subjects that jurors cannot
understand by themselves, experts emphasize the most extreme and bizarre
aspects of the battered woman syndrome in such cases. 71 Furthermore,
68. MiDRED DALEY PAGELO\V, WoMAN-BArrERING: Vicrmis AND THEIR ExT'auEi
CES 33
(1981).
69. See ANGELABROWNE, WHEN BATtERE WoMEN KILL 182-83 (1987).
Like victims of other types of trauma, women in the homicide group responded to these
assaults with reactions of depression, denial, shock, and a since[sic] of helplessness and
fear ...
... Subjected to frequent attacks and living with a constant awareess of danger, their
perceptions of alternatives to their violent situations narrowed, based on their knowledge of
the abusers' abilities to control and to harm.
I&. at 182.
70. See Mahoney, supranote 6, at 35 (identifying the sources of information as including the rise
of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome in court and popular accounts such as the book and
movie about Francine Hughes' experience, THE BURNING BED). See also, KLEIN, supra note 1, at 8.
The obsession with battered women who kill their abusers is also shared by legal scholars and feminists
who have written prolifically about these cases. See, Mahoney, supra note 6. at 35 & n.141.
71. See Mahoney, supranote 6, at 37.

1244

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1223

judges and jurors in homicide cases do not want to believe that every
abused woman has the right to defend herself by killing her abuser; instead,
they want to believe that only exceptionally troubled battered women suffer
from such debilitating victimization and deserve to be excused. As a result
of these pressures in these homicide cases, Americans perceive battered
women almost exclusively as extreme victims. They focus heavily on their
learned helplessness, passivity, and inability to perceive and act rationally.
The battered woman is helpless, irrational, emotionally distressed, or, as
Martha Mahoney has suggested, "utterly dysfunctional."72 In an almost
complete about-face from her beginnings as an agent-as-cause, the image
of battered woman became that of an extreme victim.
Initially, feminists so embraced the victimization theory that it quickly
spread to other proceedings involving battered women. For example, the
battered woman syndrome or variations on the victim image appeared in
other domestic violence contexts, such as disputes about child custody,
73
criminal prosecutions against batterers, and termination of parental rights.
Indeed, the image of the female victim became so popular that it was also
used outside of domestic violence in other feminist movements against
sexual harassment, rape, and pornography.7 4 The new era of victim
feminism had arrived in full force.
Early suggestions that battered women had any role or hand in the
violent nature of their relationships were rigorously attacked and
denounced as anti-women. Such suggestions, feminists contended, could
be interpreted to mean that these women had done something to provoke or
to continue the abuse. For instance, in her 1981 book, sociologist Mildred
Daley Pagelow attempted to explain why some women are battered only
once, and others are battered repeatedly.7 5 Using social learning theory,
she theorized that the key difference lies in the reaction that a woman has
to the first instance of violence.
72. Id. at 39. See also id. at 38-39 & nn.160-68 (summarizing the tone of descriptions of
battered women from various court opinions, including Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F. Supp. 451,456 (E.D.
Pa. 1985); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1983); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678,
680 (Ga. 1981); People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); People v. Torres, 488
N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564,567 (Wash. 1984); State v. Allery, 682
P.2d 312, 315 (Wash. 1984)).
73. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text and Part V.A.I.
74. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization andAgency, 38
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REa. 387, 387 (1993).
75. PAGELOW, supra note 68, at 42 (asking, "What are the characteristics (social and personal)
that distinguish among women who are never battered, never battered a second time, or battered
repeatedly?... And if a man batters a woman once, does he always repeat this behavior?").
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The responsibility for taking decisive action at the first occurrence

of battering appears to fall almost entirely on the woman. If a man
responds to frustration, anger, or stress in a manner he has learned to

believe is appropriate and this behavior appears to be accepted by his
spouse because of lack of negative feedback, he is most likely to
continue it. ...

...
If there is no retaliation or termination of a conjugal relationship
6
following battering, the batterer is very likely to continue battering.

Critics objected to the implication that battered women were somehow
responsible for the continuation of violence."
Such thinking was
dangerous and eerily reminiscent of the patriarchal denial that predated the
feminist exposure of domestic violence.
Over time, however, victim feminism itself came under fire. Both

feminist scholars and activists gained important insights as the victim
image aggressively took over many areas of the feminist movement. In
addition, the American public became more familiar with the victimization

theory and were better able to evaluate its merits. Inevitably, a backlash
developed between segments of feminists and the general public.

8

The

criticisms ranged from particular comments and suggestions for
improvement on the inner workings of the battered woman syndrome to

sweeping calls for new theories to replace victimization. This Article
focuses on the criticisms that disapprove of the simplicity and inaccuracy

of an "all-or-nothing" victim identity where a battered woman is solely a
victim and not at all an agent. The Article also discusses those proposals
that call for more realistic resolutions of the victim-agent debate.
76.

Id.at 44-45.

77. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 6, at 32 (disapproving Pagelow's theory because "it obscures
[power and control as issues] again by indirectly holding the woman responsible for the batterer's
continued control efforts").
78. The two authors whose works have received the most attention for rejecting victim femini-m
are Katie Roiphe and Naomi Wolf. Both wrote books that did not deal with domestic violence, but
rather date rape and sexual harassment. KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFrE: SEx. FEAR. AND
FINIMSM ON CAMPUS (1993); NAOMI WOLF, FIRE wrrH FIRm THE NEw FE.LALE POWER Aim How rr
WiLL CHANGE THE 21sr CENTURY (1993). In advocating the view that feminism had become overly
obsessed with victimization, both authors struck a raw nerve and appealed to sentiments that had
heretofore been hidden or silenced in the American populace. The incredible amount of media attention
was telling. See Schneider, supra note 74, at 392-95 & nn.27-41. Schneider reports that a computer
search in the spring of 1994 on the topic of victim feminism produced more than 1000 articles in
national newspapers and magazines in the United States. lt at 392 n.27.
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C. A CALL FOR GREATER COMPLEXITY

1. A Failure to Describe
The specific criticisms of the exclusive identification of the battered
woman as a victim can be loosely organized into several groups. The first
group attacks the "all-or-nothing" identity as a failed tool of description.
Critics point specifically to the sole focus on victimization and the
exclusion of agency as the fundamental causes of that failure. Initial
dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the "all-or-nothing" victim image as a
descriptive tool began logically with the battered woman syndrome as a
defense in homicide cases. Advocates and scholars gradually realized the
inherent weaknesses of victimization theory as they gained more
experience with each homicide case. Elizabeth Schneider described the
fundamental problem with the battered woman syndrome as the exclusively
victimized image it presents of battered women and thus, its resultant
inability to explain the final act of homicide.
Expert testimony which emphasizes or is heard to emphasize only
battered women's helplessness or victimization is necessarily partial and
incomplete because it does not address the crucial issue of the woman's
action, or her agency in a prosecution for homicide-namely, why the
battered woman acted.... Juries evaluating the claims of battered
women who have killed their batterers are looking at women who have
been both victims and actors. These women have acted to save their own
79
lives.
If a battered woman is rendered so helpless and passive by her
abuser's violence, how then does she have the wherewithal to kill her
abuser? Certainly, an answer to this question is critical to a successful
defense for a defendant accused of homicide, yet the battered woman
syndrome, or at least the current perception of the syndrome by courtroom
79. Schneider, supra note 52, at 239. Interestingly, Schneider does not necessarily blame
defense attorneys or expert witnesses for the lopsided understanding of the battered woman syndrome,
As co-counsel for amicus curiae in a New Jersey homicide case, State v. Kelly 478 A.2d 364 (N.J.
1984), she was able to observe fIrst-hand, UL at 368, that even though there were elements of agency in
the testimony on battered woman syndrome, the court appeared to ignore those elements and to hear
only the story of victimization. See Schneider, supra note 52, at 226-231.
One possible explanation is that the court finds it easier to focus on those aspects of the
testimony which characterize the woman as passive and helpless ... rather than active and
violent but reasonable....
Courts appear to be willing to recognize the importance of expert testimony when the
rationale for admission is women's individual and collective psychological "weakness."
Id. at 230.
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decisionmakers, does not provide an adequate answer. Instead, battered
women facing murder charges are placed in a difficult bind where they
must choose between using the inadequate syndrome defense or incurring
the risk of a more realistic self-description. A more realistic description
that includes elements of agency is a gamble because jurors may no longer
feel sorry for the battered women or even accept her story of victimization.
In addition to its inability to explain a final act of homicide, the "allor-nothing" victim image is also problematic as a descriptive tool because
it fails to acknowledge numerous other acts of battered women. This
weakness became increasingly apparent as the victim identity extended
itself into other legal contexts involving battered women. For example,
since the early 1990s, family courts in the United States have been
considering the effects of domestic violence on children and on battered
women in child custody and visitation proceedings.8 0 In this context as
well, battered women face the failure of an exclusively victimized image to
accurately explain the complexity of their lives and their ability to parent.
As Janice Drye explains, women are caught between emphasizing their
victimization so that family court judges will seriously consider the
domestic violence and highlighting positive acts of parenting so that the
same judges will award them custody of their children.
To prove she was actually battered, the victim must show
dysfunctionality as a result of her long suffering abuse, her failure to
report, or her failure to terminate the abusive relationship in a timely
fashion. The fact that victims frequently reconcile with their batterers
and are extremely dependent on them further indicates the
dysfunctionality of the victim. This showing of dysfunctionality comes
back to haunt the victim when she must prove that she has been the
primary caretaker and the stable element in the children's lives; a fit
parent to have the primary parenting functions. Consequently a victim
who portrays herself as an effective parent may come across too well to
the bench. Her stories of domestic violence are discredited because
she
8
does not appear helpless and dependent enough to fit the pattern. '
Because the rise of victimization has been so strong within the
movement against domestic violence, judges, prosecutors, police officers,
80.

See Janice A. Drye, The Silent Victims of Domestic Violence: Children Forgotten by the

JudicialSystem, 34 GoNz. L REv. 229, 240 (1998) ("Most states that require consideration of dorastic
violence in establishing custody and visitation rights either include domestic violence as a factor in

making the custody decision or create a preswption against custody with the batterer."). For a
description of the situation in the early 1990s, see Naomi RL Calm. Civil Images of Battered Women:
The Impact ofDomestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions,44 VAND. L REv. 1041 (1991).
81. Drye, supranote 80, at 240.
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advocates and other important actors, as well as the general public, are now
conditioned to expect battered women to behave within the rigid dictates of
the battered woman syndrome. These expectations underlie the lack of
inclusion and accommodation in the mandatory arrest and no-drop
prosecution policies that deny choices to battered women. This is
problematic because the exclusive victim focus of the syndrome does not
truthfully capture the greater complexity and inclusion of agency within the
lives of abused women.
The failure of descriptive tools leaves battered women in difficult
situations in varying legal contexts.
Such double binds would be
eliminated with the evolution of a more realistic identity for the battered
woman. In its place, Schneider does not propose a complete abandonment
of the battered woman syndrome, but instead urges a more conscious and
purposeful effort by defense attorneys and experts to expand the identity of
battered women from being solely victims to being actors and survivors
whose actions are depicted as reasonable within the context of their
victimization. 82 As she explains, the answer lies not in victimization or
agency but in victimization and agency.
Portrayal of women as solely victims or agents is neither accurate nor
adequate to explain the complex realities of women's lives. It is crucial
for feminists and feminist legal theorists to understand and explore the
role of both victimization and agency in women's lives, and to translate
83
these understandings into the theory and practice that we develop.
In agreement with this new approach, Edward Gondolf and Ellen
Fisher offer the survivor theory as a possible replacement for the battered
woman syndrome. 84 Under their theory, battered women are not helpless
victims, but instead, are active survivors who are thwarted in their attempts
85
to end the violence by community passivity and economic barriers.
Indeed, one battered woman recounted how she did try to manage the
violence with some limited success as an agent subject to victimization.
You learn how to manage all those big things, but it's always the little
things that you've got no control over. What I've learned since is that
battered women become good managers, they manage situations. You
do learn to manage the situation. You can control it, for weeks or maybe
82. See Schneider, supra note 52, at 240.
83. Id. at 239.
84. EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATrERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 17-22 (1988).
85. See id. at 17-22.
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months on end. But then the little things happen, you may have 8left
too
6
much fat on the steak, you've got no control over that whatsoever
Such evolved theories, which collapse the victim-agent dichotomy
into a single unifying identity, can serve as a basis for improved domestic
violence policies.
2. A Failure to Include
The second group of criticisms of the exclusively victimized image of
battered women relate to the failure to describe. These criticisms are
concerned with a failure to reflect and include the diversity of battered
women. Earlier in history, when domestic violence was a hidden and
ignored problem, the popular belief was that only poor women at the
margins of society suffered from abuse at home. In addition to generally
exposing the incidence of domestic violence, the feminist movement also
revealed that domestic violence occurs at all rungs of the socioeconomic
ladder.87 Despite the early bias towards the lower socioeconomic classes,
the battered woman syndrome and the victimization theory interestingly
developed to focus on the limited perspective of the battered middle class,
white woman.8 8 As a result, the theory endows the "normal" battered
woman with many traditional gender stereotypes from the dominant, white
society: "very emotional, very submissive, very excitable in a minor crisis,
very passive, very uncomfortable about being aggressive, very dependent,
very gentle. ' 89
This narrowly defined persona is not applicable to many subsets of
battered women who are not white, not middle class, or neither. These
"other" battered women not only lack these particular characteristics, but
may also be handicapped by the intersection of other popular identities
attached to their color, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic
class. For example, juries and judges may not easily accept that a battered
86. DEE DEE GLASS, 'ALL MYFAULT': WHYWoMENDON'TLFA EAusIVEMEN 115 (1995).
87. See Albert I Roberts, Introduction: Avtls and Realities Regarding Battered Women in
HELPiNG BATrERED WoMEN: Nev PERSPECMVES AND RFMmDIES 3, 4 (Albert R. Roberts, ad., 1996)

(explaining that while domestic violence takes place in all socioeconomic groups, it is more visible in
lower socioeconomic classes because of more frequent reporting to the police and to hospital
emergency rooms).
88. See Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist
Perspective, 1 UCLA WoiEN's LJ. 191, 194 (1991) ("while theories such as battered woman

syndrome explain why a battered woman's behavior is reasonable, the definition of 'woman' w.hich
guides such theories is based upon limited societal constructs of appropriate behavior for %hite

women").
89.

Ia at 196.
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African-American woman suffered from learned helplessness and acted in
self-defense because of the "dominant images of Black women as
domineering, assertive, hostile, and immoral."90 The lack of agency in
victim feminism may be particularly inaccurate for these "other" battered
women and, thus, may render the battered woman syndrome a less
persuasive and less successful defense.
In addition to their problematic lack of agency, the victim identity and
the battered woman syndrome also disappoint "other" battered women
because of their failure to incorporate more complex and diverse stories of
victimization and limited choice. Because the syndrome is based upon the
white, middle class woman, it features a fixed script of victimization; it
does not consider or accommodate other sources of oppression. For
example, women of color are simultaneously victims of racism and of their
abusers.
Women of color are often reluctant to call the police, a hesitancy likely
due to a general unwillingness among people of color to subject their
private lives to the scrutiny and control of a police force that is
frequently hostile. There is also a more generalized community ethic
against public intervention, the product of a desire to create a private
world free from the diverse assaults on the public lives of racially
subordinated people. The home is not simply a man's castle in the
patriarchal sense, but may also function as a safe haven from the
indignities of life in a racist society. However, but for this "safe haven"
in many cases,
women of color victimized by violence might otherwise
91
seek help.
Cultural beliefs, too, can complicate the victimization of battered
women. For instance, Asian and Asian American women are often
silenced from reporting their abuse by the community pressures and family
values of their ethnicity. 92 The absence of consideration of these additional
complexities experienced by these "other" battered women is a significant
weakness for the traditional victimization identity. The failure to include
the diversity of battered women undennines the effectiveness of policies
90. Id. at 204.
91.
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color,43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991).
92. See Nilda Rimonte, Domestic Violence Among Pacific Asians, in MAKINo WAvES: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN 327, 328 (Asian Women United
of California ed., 1989). "Traditionally Pacific Asians conceal and deny problems that threaten group
pride and may bring on shame. Because of the strong emphasis on obligations to the family, a Pacific
Asian woman will often remain silent rather than admit to a problem that might disgrace her family."
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that provide choices for battered women, such as orders of protection,
because they fail to consider the special obstacles faced by "other" women
in even going to court. These criticisms further confirm the need to revamp
the identity of battered women not only by recognizing agency, but also by
being more open-minded about different experiences of victimization and
expressions of agency.
3. A Failure to Focus
The third and final group of criticisms of the all-or-nothing victim
image objects to the harsh spotlight victim feminism shines on the women
while leaving the male batterers in the dark. The most telling evidence of
this lopsided view is the stubborn persistence of the question, "Why
doesn't she just leave?" Throughout the development of awareness about
domestic violence, this one question has continually captured the attention
of Americans. 93

Curiosity about the seeming failure of the woman to

abandon her abuser is typically the initial reaction for many Americans
when they learn of the latest domestic violence incident in their
community; it is almost instinctive. This is true even after decades of
public education campaigns on the difficult situations battered women face
in leaving their abusers.
Understandably, an immediate focus on the woman's behavior or lack
of behavior made sense during the early stages of the feminist movement.
There was a pressing need to develop an identity for the battered woman to
serve as an effective defense for those who were on trial for killing their
abusers. The preoccupation with the behavior of the woman, however, has
never been limited to these select homicide trials, and indeed, has not
subsided at all since the initial exposure of the horrors of domestic
violence.
The objections to this lopsided focus on the battered woman are the
following: (1) that the focus on the behavior of the woman distracts and
undermines the need to further explore and understand the blameworthy
and egregious conduct of the man; and (2) that the query, "Why didn't she
leave?" is based upon an erroneous and misguided cultural emphasis on a
unilateral termination of the battering relationship. This Article does not
agree entirely with these objections and contends that the fascination with
the behavior of women in abusive relationships is not misguided; instead,
the fascination, accompanied by other improvements, has an extraordinary
93.

See Mahoney, supranote 6, at 61 (describing it as "[t]he shopworn question (that) persists in

the cases, legal scholarship and social science literature").
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potential to motivate more effective policy solutions for the domestic
violence epidemic.
The question, "Why didn't she leave?" is a superficial symptom of an
underlying obsession with the battered woman and captures for many
feminists the problem with the victim identity. They question why so much
effort and attention has been paid to understanding battered women,
especially in comparison to the little effort and attention that has been
devoted to studying their batterers. 94 They have sought to replace the
question of "Why didn't she just leave?" with "Why did he batter?" They
argue that the feminist movement has not made much progress because the
persistent fascination with the battered woman and her victim identity are
simply contemporary versions of the historical blaming of women for
domestic violence. This doubt about progress is legitimate. Have we
really moved ahead if we are still looking to the woman, and not so much
the man, for an explanation of the violence?
Feminists' concern about diverted attention and resources is based,
however, upon the assumption that only one question and only one party to
the battering can occupy the national consciousness. This assumption is
closed-minded and does not sufficiently challenge the status quo. If the
domestic violence problem is so large and entrenched that it requires the
doubling of efforts, attention, and resources for truly effective policy
solutions, then advocates and researchers must aspire for that doubling and
not settle for anything less. Analyzing the battered woman in the
relationship is not mutually exclusive of studying the abuser; both can and
should be done. We need to understand the reasons why the woman does
not leave as well as the reasons why the man continues to batter in order to
create complete policy solutions. The difficult task is not to choose
between the questions, "Why didn't the woman leave?" or "Why did the
man batter?" Both questions are essential. The difficult task is to avoid
getting distracted by unnecessary squabbles and to increase the awareness
and available resources to work towards true, long term solutions.
The second objection feminists have to the question, "Why didn't the
woman leave?" is the exclusive emphasis it places on the termination of the
abusive relationship as the goal. 95 This Article does not advocate the
94. E.g., GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 84, at 19 (comparing when a man assaults a person
outside his home, the assumption is that there is something wrong with him and not the victim, versus
"when a man assaults his wife or partner, the tendency is to focus first on why the victim doesn't have
sense enough to avoid the violence").
95. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 6, at 61 (objecting to the assumptions that separation is the
right solution, that it is the woman's responsibility, and that the woman has the ability to achieve
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position that exit is the solution for all such relationships; certainly, there
are narratives of relationships that have successfully survived serious
domestic violence. These narratives, however, are admittedly few amongst
the overwhelming numbers of tragedies. There are understandably many
complex reasons why a woman may prefer to stay with her abuser.9 6 Quite
frequently, though, these reasons originate from the political, societal and
financial inequalities between the sexes and not from a purely emotional
desire to work through an abusive relationship.
For many battered women, exit would be their ultimate goal if it were
more financially practicable and physically safe. On a societal level also,
exit is the preferred goal because it is the only one in the long term that
provides for less physical, psychological, and emotional harm to the
woman and any affected children and has the potential to break the vicious
cycle of generational domestic violence. Policy solutions should have such
ambitious goals and should therefore work towards exit as a viable option
for all battered women.
Rather than leading us astray into victim feminism, the long-standing
question, "Why didn't she leave?" has the potential to take us in a new
direction in the victim-agent debate. All it takes is a slightly different
interpretation. The question is not about blaming the woman but is about
striving to understand her motivations and recognizing her opportunities,
however limited, to try to end the violence in her life. It could be the
starting point of a policy approach that seems to improve the woman's
options so she can safely choose to exit her domestically violent
relationship.
All three schools of criticism, whether it be the failure to describe, the
failure to include, or the failure to focus, point to a pressing need to reshape
the victim identity of battered women. The current identity neither
accurately describes the experiences of battered women nor accommodates
their diversity. Additionally, for some feminists, it places too much
emphasis on the battered women, in comparison to their abusers, thus
placing too much responsibility for ending the violence in the hands of the
women. Victimization may have played a key historical role in bringing
domestic violence to the forefront of the American consciousness;
separation). In trying to keep the agency of women within the context of the power and control exerted

by batterers on abused women, Mahoney proposes that several different questions be asked of the
woman, such as "What did you do in your search for help?" "What happened to you when you left'"
at 61-63.
and "What did he do when you left?" lId
96. See, e.g., id.at 19-21 (urging legal actors to accommodate the emotional commitmznt
women may have to their relationships, as weU as their fear).

1254

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1223

however, it has outlived its initial utility and purpose. The various attacks
from feminists demonstrate this.
The incredible inconsistency that our policies evince on the topic of
choice and battered women is a direct consequence of the growing pains
the domestic violence movement is undergoing with the victim image.
Some policies, such as mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution still
follow the victim identity and deny any choices for battered women. Other
policies, like the protection order regimes, have moved away from
victimization, and instead, aim to enhance the active agency of abused
women with better options. Policies that attribute decisions to battered
women and punish them in hindsight, without acknowledging their
victimization, are perhaps the worst. They recognize the opportunities
battered women may have to decide or act but ignore the limitations on
those opportunities. A more accurate and accommodating understanding of
battered women is necessary to eliminate the present confusion of domestic
violence policies. Effective and realistic solutions can only be based upon
an identity that combines both elements of victimization and agency.
This Article argues that the reshaping of identity lies primarily in the
recognition and acceptance of the agency that exists in a battered woman's
life. In Part IV, the Article proposes a twist on the definition of the term
"agency" and presents the use of this new identity as a powerful policy
tool.
IV.
A. CULTURAL ACCEPTANCE AND PROGRESS
As described above, there are already at least three groups of
criticisms that offer plenty of reason to abandon the exclusively victimized
identity of battered women and to replace it with an image that includes
agency. There are, however, two additional reasons why a combined
victim-agent identity will succeed. The first is the greater cultural
acceptance such an image would receive. The American political and
social culture is imbued with ideals of freedom and self-determination, both
social and economic. We perceive ourselves as being a mobile society
whose members have much control over their lives and destinies. Indeed,
"exit" is crucial to our distinct identity as a nation and culture. Thus, when
confronted with the horror stories of domestic violence, there is immediate
resistance to the notion that these women were trapped. Instead, there is an
initial puzzlement at the persistence of these relationships. Perhaps we can

20011

AGENCY IN BATTERED MOTHERS

1255

accept that she is a victim but not that she is a completely helpless victim.
Complete helplessness is dissonant with the more comfortable and
preferable self-image as a free and mobile society.
This preference for agency is even true of battered women themselves.
Many academics and practitioners have documented that battered women
often do not view themselves as battered women because they do not
identify with the extreme victimization portrayed in such theories as the
battered woman syndrome. The lack of identification may be due to a
failure to describe or include, as discussed earlier,97 but it may also be due
to a lack of cultural acceptance from the women themselves. As Martha
Mahoney observes, this lack of identification is dangerous because it
encourages the common psychological response of denial that already
delays help-seeking by many battered women. 98 The solution, however, is
not to keep pushing an exclusive victim image onto abused women.
Indeed, Martha Minow warns that overemphasis on victimization runs the
risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. 99 Instead, if the exclusive
victim identity does not fit, then it is time to craft a new identity. A new
identity that uses a new understanding of agency and combines it with
victimization will be more culturally resonant for Americans and more
personally acceptable for battered women themselves. Both cultural
resonance and personal acceptance are necessary for a successful identity.
The second reason why a combined identity will succeed is its ability
to adjust to progress; the exclusive victim identity is either already outdated
or will be in the very near future. Although there is still much more to do,
tremendous progress has undeniably been made in both the law and societal
attitudes towards domestic violence. With the help of earnest advocates,
battered women have been empowered, and the possibility of leaving
abusive relationships is more real than ever. Thirty years ago, shelters,
mandatory arrest, orders of protection, counseling for batterers, domestic
violence felonies, and custody presumptions against batterers were all
visions of imagination. Today they are reality. Admittedly, this progress
should not be exaggerated. Leaving a batterer is certainly still an
immensely difficult and trying option for many women, particularly poor
97. See discussion supra at Part IIC.1-2.
98. See Mahoney, supranote 6 at 15-19.
99. See Martha minow, Suniving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L REV. 1411, 1429 (1993).
"[Clontemporary victim talk tends to suppress the strengths and capacities of people who are victims.
Victim talk can have a kind of self-fulfilling quality, discouraging people %%hoare victimized from
developing their own strengths or working to resist the limitations they encounter." L
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and minority women. 100 Consequently, there remains a great need to do
more to help these women and to dedicate more resources to them. The
collective hope of all advocates and feminists is that progress will continue.
As it does, battered women will seem less alone and, therefore, less
completely helpless. Clearly, over time, an exclusive victim image will no
longer be satisfactory and will simply be outdated. Only a new identity
that combines elements of agency and victimization will accommodate this
progress and, indeed, embrace it. Thus, in addition to overcoming the
failures to describe, to include, and to focus, a combined identity will be an
improvement because of its cultural appeal and ability to progress.
B. A NEW DEFINITION OF AGENCY
The cornerstone of this new combined identity is the inclusion of
agency. Instead of defining "agency" to mean the opposite of victimization
in a rigid and polarized dichotomy, this Article proposes that "agency"
refer to the opportunity to make affirmative decisions or take conscious
actions that have some effect or are intended to have some effect on future
violence. The decisions can be against something and the actions can be
omissions, but the key ingredient is the consciousness of the decision or
action. This does not mean that every decision or course of conduct has to
be preceded by a long period of thought; indeed, the contemplation may
take only a few seconds. The other essential ingredient is that the decision
or action would influence or be intended to influence the violence. It may
be on the amount, the timing, or the type of the abuse. This impact may be
positive or negative. Finally, it is also important to note that, in contrast to
the original definition of agency, it is not relevant to the new definition
whether the battered woman has total freedom to act or decide. What
matters is that the battered woman has some opportunity, even if limited.
100. In coining the term "separation assault," Mahoney emphasized the very real dangers of
leaving an abusive relationship. Mahoney, supra note 6, at 65-68. At least 50% of women who leave
their batterers are followed, harassed, or further attacked by them and more than 50% of the men who
killed their spouses did so during a period of separation from their spouses. Id. at 64-65.
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C. MAKING AGENCY INTO A WORKABLE IDENTITY FOR DOMESnc

VIOLENCE POLICY

1. Battered Women Have Opportunities and These Opportunities Can Be
Targeted
In order to turn this proposed definition of agency into a new and
workable identity for battered women, several premises must be recognized
and accepted. First, intrinsic to the new definition of agency itself, battered
women do have opportunities or moments in time when they are called
upon to make decisions or to take actions that have the potential to affect
the future course of their abuse. These decisions or actions could be
extremely serious or consequential, such as going to a hospital emergency
room to seek medical treatment or continuing to work outside the home.
They could also operate on a more minute, everyday scale; for example, a
battered woman may have to decide what to make for dinner that evening
or how to keep the children quiet and calm. As revealed by the numerous
women I interviewed at the District Attorney's Office, decisions they made
101
in consideration of the violence in their lives were both major and minor.
It is reasonable to predict that the above-described examples are all
decisions or actions that have the potential to influence the future course of
abuse, even if specific cases in hindsight may not have had any effect
whatsoever. There has been a sufficient amount of research into numerous
women's experiences of domestic abuse to enable policymakers to predict
reasonably well which decisions or actions are critical for battered women
and the future course of their abuse. Additionally, the studies of batterers
so far can also be helpful. 02
2. Battered Women Are Still Victims, Albeit Not Exclusively
The second premise that must be recognized and accepted in order for
this new identity to work successfully on behalf of battered women is that
101. See supratext accompanying note 12. Indeed, one way to define a battered woman is to ask
whether her thoughts, beliefs, or conduct have been affected by her abuser because such control and
power is certainly the goal of the abuser. If she has modified her behavior in any way to avoid the
violence, then she is a battered woman. See. Mahoney, supra note 6. at 33.
102. Even with all this research, there will always be a margin of error in that policyn akers may
be over-inclusive and under-inclusive in their designation of what are the critical decisions and actions.
For example, a battered woman may take actions or make decisions that suddenly escalate the violence
even though these actions and decisions may have been overlooked as insignificant by policytnakers.
After thirty years of research, though, this margin of error is comfortably small enough to daviclop
policies based upon reasonable predictions of the critical decisions and actions for battered woman.
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agency is not the same as control, and having a role is not the same as
being blamed. It is prudent to note here what the first premise does not
state. It does not state that these opportunities for decisions or actions are
necessarily potent or consequential. In other words, it does not profess that
battered women have the ability to control their abuse. Indeed, because
this new and more comprehensive identity combines elements of both
agency and victimization, it rejects the extreme characterization that is
more consistent with the old definition of agency where an individual is
completely atomistic and self-determining. All too often, conservatives
and others who are tired of victim feminism interpret opportunity for action
to be the same as control over the abuse, and therefore, believe it is
justified to penalize battered women anytime they do not use their
opportunities and control to end the abuse. Again, this ignores the
victimization and simply latches onto an extreme agency perspective. The
proposed victim-agent identity instead recognizes the opportunities for
action or decision while simultaneously recognizing the insurmountable
obstacles that may prevent actions and decisions from reducing,
eliminating, or affecting the abuse at all.
Whether a woman's actions or decisions have any influence will
depend upon factors that are too numerous to list here. In order to be fair to
those who do not have such influence, policies based upon this new
definition of agency and the proposed combined identity of battered
women must also be open and inclusive in their understanding of
victimization. In addition, the lives of battered women are complex, and
there will be times when the goal behind an action or decision is not
necessarily to avoid or affect future violence. Battered women may have
other equally legitimate short-term and long-term goals. While coherence
in policymaking may require the prioritization of certain goals above
others, the victim-agent identity does not dictate such a prioritizing process;
this new identity could also be the foundation of more flexible policies.
It is true that a new definition of agency, and consequently, the new
combined identity are based upon the concept that domestic violence is a
phenomenon that takes place between two people. It is a certain type of
relationship between those two individuals, and like other relationships,
each person plays a role and has the chance to affect the course of that
relationship. Having a role or impact, however, does not necessarily
translate into being blamed for the nature of that relationship; and
recognition of the role does not necessarily lead to imposition of penalties.
[We should, as a matter of moral and social choice, validate the
capacities and choices available to people who have been victimized-
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but not treat this as a reason to shift all blame to them and away from
others or vice versa. The fact that a woman could leave an abusive

relationship should be explored and promoted, but not used as a basis for
blaming her for being battered.... The problem is not blame and cause,
but responsibility. How can our discussions move from placing blame to
promoting the ability of people in different circumstances to respond to
the problems that give rise to charges of victimization?10 3

The classic case of domestic violence involves an extremely
inequitable relationship in which the batterer has introduced abuse and
maintained most of the power and control in the relationship. The battered

woman should not be blamed or punished for the limited agency that she
may have been able to exercise simply on the grounds that she had some
opportunities. What cannot be overlooked is that these opportunities may
be limited ones. Policymakers hoping to use a new identity inclusive of
agency need to be wary of such thinking.

3. Battered Women Are Rational
The final premise that must be recognized and accepted is that
battered women are capable of acting rationally even while suffering the

debilitating effects of their abuse.1 4 This may not be true for all battered
women at all stages of an abusive relationship, 05 but there is plenty of
evidence of rational behavior among battered women, especially mothers
and those who are in earlier stages of the abuse. This rationality can be

seen in the multitude of interviews conducted with battered women or in
their own narratives. 116 What initially appears irrational may be, upon
103. See Minow, supranote 99, at 1441-42.
104. In urging a redefinition of the battered woman syndrome, one advocate describ-d a battered
woman as "a nonnal woman who finds herself in a defective or dysfunctional relationship. surrounded
by the realities of life confronting a woman today" Michael Dowd, Dispelling the M3yhs Aboat the
"Battered Woman's Defense:" Towards a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM URB. Li. 567. 578
(1992).
105. Some advocates believe that domestic violence victims can be rendered completely helpless
and irrational in extreme circumstances. A notorious example of a battered woman who was arguably
too debilitated to act rationally is Hedda Nussbaum. Through severe physical abuse and control over
her drug addiction, Joel Steinberg was able to completely control Hedda Nussbaum such that she no
longer sought escape and instead believed that the worst thing for her would be to leave him. His
control caused her to lie to the police and prevented her from seeking any help. Her autonomy had been
entirely stripped by him. See Ruth Jones, Guardianshipfor Coercively Controlled Battered Women:
Breaking the Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. Ui. 605, 605-09 (2000) (criticizing empowerment
policies as ineffective for those battered women who are "coercively controlled" by their abusers and
proposing a guardianship remedy as a means of restoring control to such women).
106. See Kristian Miccio, In the Nante of Mothers and Children: Deconstncting the 3Atll of the
Passive Battered Mother and the "Protected Child" in Child Neglect Proceedings. 58 ALB. L REV.
1087, 1100-01 n.82 (1995) (concluding from countless cases handled at the Albany Law School Family
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closer examination, rational. The rationality of battered women can easily
be misconstrued as irrationality if there is a narrow conception of the goals
towards which battered women are expected to be working. For example,
Mahoney protests that, more often than not, the only conceivable goal is
termination of the relationship. As a result, unsurprisingly, battered women
may appear to act irrationally. Once the range of goals is expanded, the
behavior of battered women can be better appreciated as rational. While
there are always exceptions to this, policymakers should not design entire
domestic violence strategies based on the exceptions; instead, successful
policies should be built to target battered women early on in domestic
violence and to work with them as rational agents.
D. AGENCY AS A FOUNDATION FOR POLICY

With these three premises, the new definition of agency can be easily
incorporated into a new identity for battered women without undermining
or downplaying their victimization. Because they are not defined as
opposing categories in a rigid dichotomy, agency and victimization can coexist in a more comprehensive image of the battered woman. Instead of
having to choose between the simplistic characterization as an autonomous
agent or an oppressed victim, a battered woman can be more realistically
viewed as both. She has opportunities to make decisions and to take
actions that will influence or try to influence the future course of the abuse,
but these opportunities may be restricted in some fashion. The limitations
may come from the abusive behavior of the batterer; the particular cultural,
ethnic, or minority group values of the woman; the failings of the criminal
justice system; or the lack of adequate social services and support. The
limitations or restrictions may be real or merely perceived as such by the
battered women. They may be complete obstacles to any effective action
or only partial blockades.
This new victim-agent identity of battered women can be a powerful
policy tool. Policymakers can identify those decision- and action-junctures
they deem as critical to stopping or reducing the domestic violence. They
then can rely on the rationality and agency of battered women by using
both positive support and negative consequences to steer women into using
these identified opportunities towards desirable outcomes. Positive support
should include genuinely helpful social services that work towards longViolence Clinic and the Center for Battered Women's Legal Services that battered women often engage
in strategic acts to protect themselves and their children from harm, such as hiding or disposing of
potential weapons, refusing to reveal where children are hidden, or stepping in between their children
and batterers).
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term solutions, such as useful job training and permanent housing options.
Negative consequences can range from suspension of certain privileges at
shelters to modification of visitation or custody rights.
It is critical, though, that such policies not operate in hindsight and
that the positive support and negative consequences be implemented only
in the following chronological order. Initially, it is imperative that
domestic violence be identified in a household and that the battered woman
and any children be stabilized in an environment safe and separate from the
abuser. Safety and stabilization are critical at the beginning; otherwise, the
battered woman will only be capable of acting as an agent within the
limiting and debilitating confines of her victimization. Her efforts at
moving towards desirable outcomes will only be frustrated by the
uncontrollable behavior of her abuser. Once a battered woman and her
children have been provided a safe and separate environment, her agency is
enhanced and her victimization is reduced. She has a better chance of
using her agency opportunities to move towards desirable outcomes.
At that point, policies can offer intensive, quality, positive support to
the woman to encourage certain actions or decisions. She should be
informed beforehand of any negative consequences if she makes contrary
actions or decisions. In order to capture the full deterrent effect of these
negative consequences, they must be known to the woman beforehand.
They will become incentives for her to do what she can to contribute to an
end to the domestic violence. Only if a woman decides or acts in a manner
that definitively undermines the desired outcomes of such policies should
she face very serious repercussions. This is fair so long as her situation has
been stabilized and so long as she has had the benefit of positive support as
she knowingly makes her critical choices. Still, decisionmakers who are in
charge of such policies and their negative consequences should be openminded and fair in judging a battered woman, while maintaining a
reasonably firm grip on the ultimate policy objectives at hand. The final
part of this Article offers an example of how such a policy built upon this
new understanding of the battered woman could work within the context of
failure to protect proceedings against battered mothers.
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V.

A. FAILURE TO PROTECT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BATTERED MOTHERS:
THE CURRENT SITUATION

Perhaps the most controversial topic in the domestic violence
movement now is the rising trend of states charging battered women with
the failure to protect their children from domestic violence. Battered
mothers have faced these accusations of failure to protect for quite some
time. 0 7 Indeed, there have been so many cases that battered mothers ;re
now afraid of reporting domestic violence incidents to the authorities or
shelters for fear of losing their children, especially in states with mandatory

child abuse reporting statutes." 8 Ironically, it was the reforms within
custody and visitation determinations that paved the way towards failure to

protect proceedings against battered mothers. 109

In order to get state

legislatures and family courts to approve presumptions against custody or

visitation of children by abusers, domestic violence advocates needed to
persuade them of the deleterious harms suffered by children from even
witnessing the violence." 0 They managed to do this successfully by citing
existing research and commissioning further studies to document such
harms."' The same theories of harm then began to appear in failure to
107. Two law review articles concerning this trend appeared as early as the mid 1990s. See, V.
Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and
Abused Children, 19 HARV. WoMEN's L. 229 (1996); Miccio, supra note 106.
108. See The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers with "Failure to
Protect":Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORD. URB. L.J. 849 (2000) (protesting New York City Policy of
immediate removal). In Massachusetts, the Department of Social Services observed an increase in child
abuse reports and a decrease in help-seeking by battered women when they began using domestic
violence as an indicia of child abuse without providing any follow-up training or clinical support. Id. at
857 (citing NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE:
EMERGING PROGRAMS FOR BATTERED MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 15 (1998)).

109.
110.

See The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 108, at 850-51.
It is estimated that every year, 3.3 million children witness acts of domestic violence and that

children are present in almost half of all battery incidents. See Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS

WORK?, supranote 25, at 3 (explaining that children are the "hidden victims" of domestic violence).
111. Research on the effect on children of witnessing violence between their parents has been
growing since the early 1980's and has included controlled studies. The general conclusion from these
efforts is that children who are exposed to domestic violence tend to exhibit elevated levels of some
measured symptoms, and therefore, have a diminished well-being. See Bonnie E. Carlson, Children of
Battered Women: Research, Programs, and Services, in HELPING BATTERED WOMEN: NEW
PERSPECTIVES AND REMEDIES 172, 172-74 & Table 11.1 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1996) (summarizing

and citing 10 reports from 1986 to 1991). One such report, entitled "The Impact of Domestic Violence
on Children," urges both lawyers and judges to protect children from the terrible impact of domestic
violence. Released in 1994 by the American Bar Association, it cited to the statistics that 75% of boys
who witness the beating of their mothers have demonstrable behavior problems, that 20 to 40% of
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protect proceedings as family courts cited to the same studies, and even the
legislative findings for the custody presumptions, as foundations for their
findings against battered mothers.1 12 This was certainly an unintended and
unforeseen turn of events for both feminists and domestic violence
advocates.
In addition to the documentation of harm to children from exposure to
domestic violence, the trend of failure to protect proceedings was also
motivated by the unequal and romanticized expectations that society places
upon mothers and not fathers. Mothers in general are held to a standard of
perfection that they can and should protect their children from all harm,
even at risk of death or serious physical injury to themselves." 3 When it
comes to domestic violence, the experience of battered mothers is exactly
the same. In the inevitable search for whom to blame for the tragic
experiences of abused and neglected children in domestic violence
families, society has not stopped (or necessarily, started) with the abusers
themselves but has expressed its wrath at battered mothers. Battered
mothers who do not sacrifice their own lives and limbs on behalf of their
children but, instead, strive for their own survival as well as the survival of
their children are considered bad mothers who fail to protect their children.
Exalting the uncompromising importance of child safety, society has
rushed to place blame on these mothers without engaging in a serious and
thoughtful analysis of the entire dynamics in a domestic violence situation.
1. The Different Types of Proceedings
Under the umbrella phrase, "failure to protect," there are actually four
different types of legal proceedings in which battered mothers may face
such accusations. They are (1) criminal prosecution; (2) civil termination
of parental rights by the state; (3) civil lawsuits by parties other than the
chronically violent teens lived in homes with domestic violence and that 63% of young men from ages
11 to 20 in jail on homicide charges had killed the batterers of their mothers. See Roberts, supranote
87, at 8. Children also suffer from increased incidence of psychological problems such as dapression.
anxiety, aggression, shyness, and lowered social competency. Do ARRESTS AND RESnTAINtNG ORDERS
WORK?, supra note 25, at 3 (citing David A. Wolfe, Peter Jaffe, Susan Kaye Wilson, & Lydia Zak.

Children of Battered Women: 7he Relation of Child Behavior to Fanily Violence and MaternalStress.
53 J. CONSULTING & CIICAL PSYCH. 657 (1985)).
112. See The "Failure to Protecet" Working Group. supra note 108. at 852 (citing the opinion of In
re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998)).
113. See G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining. Reconstructing. and
Recreating the Battered Mother in Child Protective Proceedings. 22 HARV. WoME'S Li. 89. 93

(1999).
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state;.. 4 and (4) child custody and visitation proceedings in family court.
In addition to these four procedural possibilities, the specific substantive
accusations may also vary: a battered mother may be accused of failing to
protect her children from actual abuse or neglect perpetrated by the batterer
against the children or, more simply, failing to protect her children from
being exposed to the abuse perpetrated by the batterer against herself.
Whether the children have experienced abuse or neglect themselves at the
hands of the abuser or whether they have merely witnessed the abuse of
their mother is a significant determinant of which type of failure to protect
proceeding the battered mother may face. Aside from the following brief
descriptions of the other three types of proceedings, this Article is mostly
concerned with civil termination of parental rights by the state.
Criminal prosecutions of battered mothers are typically reserved for
those incidents in which a child has directly suffered abuse or neglect. As
of 1996, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia had criminal child
abuse laws." 5 In thirty-eight of these jurisdictions, the laws allow for the
criminal prosecution of "omissions," where a person who has a duty to
protect a child from abuse fails to do so.16 Some of these statutes require
that there be reckless knowledge or malicious intent behind the omission,
but many of them do not require any level of intent whatsoever. In these
states, battered mothers may be held strictly and criminally liable for the
harms they fail to prevent. 7 In her attack on these criminal prosecutions,
V. Pualani Enos describes several troubling assumptions and myths that
underlie these proceedings, one of which is that knowledge of abuse is the
same as the ability to stop the abuse and protect the child. 118 Without
taking a closer look at the victimization and agency dynamics of a
woman's domestic violence situation, such proceedings may unfairly
require that she prevent all harm to her child, even when she has absolutely
no control over the source of the harm and is herself being harmed by that
same source. What is particularly exasperating is that, in some cases, the
respective criminal punishments for the actual abuser and for the battered
114.

Although this is rare, there are some states in which victims of abuse can civilly sue not only

their abusers, but also any other parties who were under a duty to protect them but did not do so. This
could include a battered mother. One Michigan court recently permitted what may have been such a
claim. See Phillips v. Deihm, 541 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
115. Enos, supra note 107, at 236.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 237. In addition to the child abuse laws, most states have also used other criminal
provisions such as murder, manslaughter, assault, battery, mayhem, endangering the welfare of a minor,
and criminal child neglect to prosecute battered mothers. See id. at 238-39.
118. Il at240.
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mother are strikingly similar although there clearly should be greater
consideration of the violence and abuse also suffered by the mother.19
In these criminal prosecutions, emotions are often running high over
the horrifying harms inflicted on an innocent child. There is little
consideration or sympathy left over for the victimization the battered
mother may have endured. There is only anger and outrage over the bit of
agency she may have displayed or failed to display in an omission case.
Similar to criminal prosecutions of battered women who kill, 20 criminal
prosecutions of battered mothers punish the alleged choices of women
without fair consideration of their victimization.
Emotions are also intense in the context of custody and visitation
hearings. Even though there have been significant improvements in the
consideration of domestic violence during such proceedings, battered
mothers may still find themselves dealing with accusations of failure to
protect. For instance, leaving her children behind in the common domicile
when fleeing from a very real threat of death or serious physical injury may
be a decision that comes back to haunt a battered mother in the worst way.
2. The Civil Termination of Parental Rights of Battered Mothers
Arguably more serious than the criminal prosecutions and the custody
disputes are the civil proceedings brought by states to terminate the
parental rights of battered mothers to their children. For some women, the
terminations are the civil equivalent to the death penalty or life
imprisonment.
The rights of parents to determine their children's upbringing and to
be involved in their lives have both constitutional and emotional
dimensions. The Supreme Court clearly endorsed this position in the
seminal case of Wisconsin v. Yoder in 1972.121 However, parental rights
are not absolute; all fifty states have the power to remove children from
their parents and to terminate all contact if the children are neglected,
abused, or mistreated.'2 2 Typically, the agencies responsible for such
119. See idL at 260-61 (protesting that battered mother received seven years in prison for her
failure to stop her abuser from raping her daughter while the abuserrapist received only ten and onehalf years in prison in a plea bargain agreement for committing rape in the unreported case of Janice

Loch in Minnesota).
120. See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
121.

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,213-15 (1972).

122.

See, eg., id; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510.534-35 (1925).
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removals and terminations are local child welfare agencies acting under the
123
authority of state laws.
Numerous states now have statutes that specifically include failure to

protect as one way in which parents or custodians may be found guilty of
child neglect or abuse, and lose their parental rights. 124 These child
protective laws have been used against battered mothers on the specific
grounds that the mothers failed to protect their children from exposure to
domestic violence.
Courts in these states have approved of this
application. 125 Of particular concern to both feminists and domestic
violence advocates about the current practice is that some states are using a
26
strict liability standard in these proceedings against battered mothers.'
What this means, practically speaking, is that the child welfare agency need

only prove two elements to achieve a finding of neglect or abuse: the
relationship of mother to child and the existence of harm from exposure to

domestic violence. 127 It is irrelevant under a strict liability standard what a
battered mother's particular intentions or actions were. If there is harm and
she is the mother, then she has failed to protect the children from the harm,
and therefore, her parental rights should be negatively affected.1 28 There is
no consideration of her agency or victimization. Essentially, because

courts and agencies are overwhelmed and angered by the sad plight of
children living with domestic violence, they have closed their eyes to the
complexities of the violence against the mother and, instead, have grasped
at the easy and comforting solution of blaming the mother too. Without
any real analysis, a battered mother is regarded as a danger to her children,
123. These agencies are charged with the investigation of abuse and neglect allegations and with
the case of children in danger. See MARK HARDIN & ROBERT LANCOUR, EARLY TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS: DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE STATUTORY GROUNDS 5 (1996).
124. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. Cr. AcT § 1012(f)(i) (McKinney 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6401(1) (1986 & Supp. 1996); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(b) (West 1998); OH1IO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1998).
125. See, e.g., In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998).
126. See Miccio, supra note 106, at 1092-96. See also The "Failure to Protect" Working Group,
supra note 108, at 852-54; Miccio, supra note 113, at 107-10.
127. See Miccio, supra note 113, at 107.
128. In New York State, the watershed case establishing the strict liability standard was It re
Glenn G, 587 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992). In that case, the court upheld a strict liability
standard in establishing child neglect charges against a battered mother for failure to protect her
children from domestic violence. See id. at 470. Admittedly, the same court did reject a strict liability
standard for the child abuse charges on the grounds that a battered mother subject to victimization and
abuse at the hands of the same abuser should not be held guilty of the abuse without any intent or guilty
conduct. See id. There is, however, little difference between findings of child neglect or child abuse; in
both scenarios, the battered mother's parental rights to her children are seriously compromised. See
Miccio, supra note 113, at 108.
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just as the abuser is, instead of being perceived as another victim of the
129
abuser allied with her children.
Beyond the substantive standard of liability, there are also troubling
practices in the procedures of civil termination of parental rights. In New
York City, for instance, the removal of children precedes the ultimate legal
determination of abuse, neglect, or in some states, abandonment. 130 Even
more troubling, the removal of children commonly precedes any offer or
requirement of counseling for battered mothers, even when domestic
violence has been identified in the household. 131 This is especially true in
New York City where children have recently died or suffered severe
injuries as a result of abuse in notorious cases that went undetected or were
mishandled by the local agencies. 132 The political pressure is tremendously
in favor of removal. Immediate removal into foster care has become the
universal response for caseworkers, lawyers representing child welfare
agencies, and judges, as each errs on the side of extreme caution and safety.
"Better safe than sorry" has become the universal motto.
After the immediate removal, requirements may be imposed by the
agency or the court for battered mothers to receive counseling and to
maintain separate domicile from their abusers.
Oftentimes, these
requirements are imposed without any real offer of assistance. 13 3 Some
women end up looking for counseling or services by themselves. In many
jurisdictions, it is still extremely difficult to find decent counseling,
services and shelter for domestic violence cases. Over a prolonged period
of time, without the necessary positive support, many battered mothers find
themselves still vulnerable to the abuse of their batterers or even worse,
staying or reuniting with their batterers. Thus, long before any final
hearing on termination of their parental rights, the practice of immediate
removal has already punished battered mothers with separation from their
children.
129. See Mlccio, supranote 113, at 108.
Strict liability as a legal standard is dangerous because it apportions responsibility based on
status, not on conduct. The abused mother suffers the same consequences as the abusive
father, therefore, the perpetrator and the victim are legally indistinguishable. Such
reductionism obscures violence against the mother and the root causes of the harm to the child
remain unchallenged and unchanged.

Id.
130.

See Telephone Interview with Amy Chan, former attorney at Administration for Children's

Services, (Sept. 29,2000).
131. See i.
132.

See i.

133.

See i. See also The "Failure to Protect" Vorking Group. supra note 105, at 855-56.
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B. HOW TO IMPROVE THE CURRENT SITUATION FOR BATI'ERED MOTHERS

AND THEIR CHILDREN
The strict liability standard and the immediate removal of children are
only two of several problems with the current trend of failure to protect
proceedings against battered mothers. The one theme that unifies many of
the problems can be traced back to the earlier discussion of the
inconsistency on choice and battered women exhibited by current domestic
violence policies. Failure to protect proceedings fall into the third and final
category of punishing the choices of battered women in hindsight. If
society recognizes the victimization in battered women's lives, how then
can society blindly blame these women for the domestic violence that their
children observe without considering that victimization? How can society
remove their children without first offering them assistance and an
opportunity to demonstrate that they can protect their children from
domestic violence with help?
Punishing battered mothers without
recognizing that they do not have complete control over their situation, and
without offering much-needed assistance, is inconsistent with our
knowledge of domestic violence and is patently unfair. It is cowardly to
regress to the historical blaming and cultural expectations of perfection and
self-sacrifice placed on battered women and, particularly, battered mothers.
So, what is the answer? Should states stop bringing all failure to
protect proceedings against battered mothers? Should states never be
allowed to infringe upon their parental rights? This Article proposes that
the answer does not lie in such extreme measures because failure to protect
proceedings themselves are not inherently problematic.
What is
problematic are the rules, regulations, and practices that currently dictate
how these failure to protect proceedings are conducted. The rules,
regulations, and practices are what need to be changed and improved, but
the proceedings themselves are necessary and should stay.
1. The Intersection of Interests Between Battered Mothers and Their
Children
One of the strongest camps of supporters for failure to protect
proceedings, even against battered mothers, has been the advocates for
children. For such groups, the paramount concern is the safety and welfare
of children. They believe that the priority of children's safety and welfare
justifies the immediate removal of children from their battered mothers, the
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strict liability standards, and other harsh current practices. 134 Support has
also come from the American public, which generally shares in the concern

for children, and from legislators, judges, and policymakers who recognize
that children are a powerful political motivator. It is true that children

deserve our deepest commitment and attention, and that is why failure to
protect proceedings must continue.

The problem with the current practices, rules, and regulations is that
they fail to recognize that battered mothers have the same interests as their
children. Mothers and their children, especially those caught together in
domestically violent households, have a tightly woven relationship in three
significant ways. First, both the battered woman and her children may be
suffering abuse by the batterer. In a study of women who killed their
abusers, 71% reported that the batterers "had physically and/or sexually
abused the children by the end of the relationship."' 13 Second, studies and
research in domestic violence have documented that children are naturally
a great, if not the greatest, motivation for battered mothers. 36 Very
frequently, battered mothers make their most serious efforts to leave their
batterers when they realize that their children are being harmed by the
domestic violence.1 37 Mothers who decide to stay with their batterers also
explain that they are doing so for the children. Even batterers realize that
they can easily manipulate mothers through their children and frequently
file counter-custody and visitation claims to further control the women.
Third, while both the women and the children are being victimized by
the abuser, the women are in a superior position to the children simply
because they are adults and the children are not. Children, especially
young ones, have a limited understanding of what is happening and what is
right or wrong. Even if they comprehend that the abuse is wrong, they then
face the difficult task of figuring out how to get help or end the abuse. The
children's vulnerability is further compounded by the fact that domestic
violence usually occurs within the privacy of homes, and thus is not open
134.

At times, immediate removal may be justifiable. For instance, research has documented an

increased incidence of child abuse by battered mothers. See BROWtNE, supra note 69, at 71 (tbattered

women are up to eight times more likely to abuse their children when they are with an abusive partner
than when they are not in an abusive relationship"). These cases, however, do not justify the currently
high levels of immediate removal or immediate removal as a default policy, as is currently the practice
in many jurisdictions.
135. 1& at 70.
136. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 6, at 19-23.
137. See id See also ANN GOETING, GETTING Otrr LIFE SToREs OF WO-- WHO LEFr

ABusivE MEN 12-13 (1999). "%any women who leave batterers recall an incident involving the
children as the point of no return. They simply will not tolerate the children either witnessing the abuse
of their mother or being abused themselves.". Id.
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and obvious to people outside the household. As a result of their position
as the adult victim and as a result of the privacy of domestic violence,
battered mothers are desperately needed by their children as protectors.
2. Using the New Agent-Victim Identity in Failure to Protect Proceedings
Given this powerful trio of factors, policymakers should take
advantage of this tightly woven relationship and work with battered
mothers as the most potent defenders of their children. Many of these
children do not need to be separated from their non-violent parent; rather,
these children, along with their non-violent parent, need support and
assistance as they seek to create a safe and non-violent life together.
This Article proposes two procedural improvements to failure to
protect proceedings. First, where there is evidence of abuse against the
mother, there should be a mandatory probationary period. This period must
include intensive counseling and positive support services for the mother
and her children prior to any separation from the mother, any final findings
of abuse or neglect, and any termination of parental rights. Once domestic
violence is identified, a battered mother and her children should be secured
together in a safe environment separate from the batterer. This can be
achieved by removing the abuser from the household or by having the
mother and children go to a shelter. Once residential arrangements have
been stabilized, substantial positive support should be given to the battered
mother. This should include any of the following: addiction counseling,
emotional counseling, assistance in adjusting to any relocation, job
training, applying for welfare and permanent housing, self-defense training,
parenting classes, 138 petitioning for orders of protection, and for orders of
139
custody and child support.
Second, it should also be made clear during the probationary period
that any act or decision the battered mother makes that unreasonably risks a
reoccurrence of the domestic violence and cannot be justified will be
subject to serious repercussions. She should be made aware of the
138. Because children who witness domestic violence are more at risk for behavioral problems,
parenting classes are very important, especially at shelters. The focus of such classes is on nonviolent
forms of discipline, such as consistent limit setting and time outs. Such classes are mandatory at some
shelters, including the Long Island Women's Coalition shelter in New York. See Carlson, supra note
I 11, at 184.
139. In summarizing the findings of her study of battered women, Pagelow emphasized the
importance of positive responses from social institutions and the personal and material resources of the
women in shortening the amount of time spent in abusive relationships. See PAOGELOW, supra note 68,
at 220-21. Because her study was conducted in the mid to late 1970s, the most critical change in
soceital institutions during that time was the rise in shelters for battered women. See id. at 221.
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possibility of removal of her children and suspension or permanent
termination of her parental rights. Such negative consequences, though,
will become a reality only after the intensive positive support services.
Some may question the need for the negative consequences or failure
to protect proceedings. These serious consequences and proceedings are,
however, necessary. After all, there will be some battered mothers who
genuinely fail to exercise the reasonable care and protection needed for the
children's welfare or who even abuse their children themselves. Failure to
protect proceedings must continue to ensure the safety of these less
fortunate children. Just as every battered woman does not have a right to
kill her abuser, there should not be blanket immunity for battered mothers
from such charges simply on the grounds of their being battered. Such a
policy would signal a return to the exclusively victimized identity of
women. Instead, a true understanding of the new combined victim-agent
identity of battered women includes an acknowledgement that some
women will not use their agency opportunities to decide or to act towards
the goal of ending the violence.
These women are not necessarily being victimized or irrational.
Domestic violence is a complicated phenomenon that occurs within the
complex context of a relationship between two people. At different points
in the process of extricating themselves from a domestically violent
relationship, battered women may have different goals and hopes for their
future.14 There is not one straight and narrow path to ending domestic
violence; rather, there are as many different paths as there are individual
battered women. The proposal described above would encourage women
at different forks in the road not to accept any chance of a reoccurrence of
domestic violence at the risk of losing their children.
Although it is possible that batterers may still be emotionally abusing
and controlling the women, the purpose of the substantial positive support
is to reduce the effect of such abuse as much as possible. This Article also
proposes improved termination or removal hearings that sincerely explore
the individual circumstances of each battered mother and accommodate
those who have plausible explanations for their seemingly contrary actions
or decisions. Strict liability standards should be abandoned in favor of
more subjective standards that accommodate and recognize the rational
140. It is critical to understand that getting out of a battering relationship is a process as opposed
to a singular event See GOErrGz, supra note 137, at 15 (citing studies that dacument that women
leave abusive relationships an average of five times before a permanent termination and that the average
length of time required to successfully leave is eight years).
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steps that battered women take in the interests of their children. With the
probationary period of substantial positive support, though, judges and
agencies should feel justified in erring on the side of safety and welfare of
the children over the parental rights of a battered mother.
Some feminists and domestic violence advocates may still object to
the imposition of any negative consequences whatsoever. They equate
such consequences with unfairly blaming the woman and attributing
responsibility to her for the domestic violence. Recognizing the role that
battered women have in their relationships is not, however, the same as
labeling her as a blameworthy party. This new definition of agency would
not involve, at least initially, any negative moral stigma. Domestic
violence is an interaction between two people, and it is critical that
policymakers try to prevent its occurrence by using both positive and
negative consequences on both parties. Moral stigma may attach under this
proposal after the woman has received substantial positive support and has
been given a serious opportunity to free herself and her children of the
violence.
That is why inadequate social services are not acceptable if there are
to be fair and effective domestic violence policies. The positive support
must be plentiful and substantial. A few jurisdictions in the United States
have programs that can be models or starting points for this positive
support. The most successful ones have used coordinated community
efforts to build cooperation and coalitions between child and domestic
violence victim advocates. These coordinated community efforts have
been made at the local level and have involved child protective agencies,
children's hospitals, prosecutors' offices, and welfare services. Some
inspiring programs include The Dependency Court Intervention Program
for Family Violence in Miami, Project Awake at Children's Hospital in
Boston, the Family Violence Program in San Diego, and the Domestic
Violence Unit of the Massachusetts Department of Social Services.
This proposal to improve the current rules and practices in the removal
of children and termination of parental rights seeks to capitalize on the a
understanding of battered women as both agents and victims. It is based on
the reality that battered women do make decisions and take actions that can
sometimes affect the future course of the violence; therefore, they may be
able to exert some influence over the exposure of their children to it. Such
choices and opportunities for choice should be recognized and seized upon
by policymakers, but importantly, the proposal also recognizes that battered
mothers cannot do this alone and that they need real support. They need
help to get past the victimization of their batterers, to have more options,
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and to make better choices for their future. Only then should society pass
judgment on their actions and decisions-and not one moment before.
C. CONCLUSION

Current domestic violence policies represent a random and
inconsistent mix of positions on whether battered women are capable of
making choices and whether their choices should be respected or punished.
They send a confused message to battered women about their role in the
movement against domestic violence and reflect the continuing difficulties
that feminists, domestic violence advocates, and the American public have
in moving beyond the inadequacies of an exclusively victimized identity of
battered women. This Article has proposed a new understanding of the
battered woman that respects both her agency and victimization. In turn,
this understanding can be the foundation of improved policies that wvill
effectively include and help the battered woman in the fight against
domestic violence. This Article has proposed one area that is ripe for such
a policy-the civil termination of parental rights of battered mothers. This
is only one proposal. It is my hope that this Article inspires more.
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